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ABSTRACT 
The Constitution of Bangladesh has provided the President with the 
unfettered power to appoint the Chief Justice of Bangladesh. However, 
the President is required by the Constitution to act on the advice of the 
Prime Minister, after consulting the Chief Justice, in appointing the puisne 
judges of the Supreme Court the apex court of the nation. This Article 
finds that in the absence of any specific constitutional provisions specifying 
that the senior-most judge of the Appellate Division the higher Division 
of the Supreme Courtshould be appointed as the Chief Justice, a 
convention to this effect was developed for ensuring that extraneous 
considerations did not play a part in the pivotal appointment of the Chief 
Justice. In the same vein, a convention of appointing the senior-most 
judges of the High Court Division, which is the lower Division of the 
Supreme Court, as the judges of the Appellate Division was developed. 
However, both these conventions have been transgressed at regular 
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intervals by succeeding generations of executives, particularly by the 
current one, for politicizing the superior judiciary of the nation, thereby 
undermining its credibility in the eyes of the litigants as an impartial 
arbitrator of disputes. Accordingly, this article concludes that in order to 
exclude the possibility of appointments on extraneous considerations, the 
principles of appointing the Chief Justice and the other judges of the 
Appellate Division on the basis of seniority should be inserted in the 
Constitution by means of an amendment. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The method of appointment of judges in the higher judiciary is inextricably 
linked to the substantive independence of the judges. This independence 
allows judges to arrive at their decisions in accordance with their oath of 
office without submitting to any kind of internal or external pressures. As 
a result, judges rely upon only their own senses of justice and the dictates 
of law. In the words of Socrates, fair judges are required to do four things, 
namely, “to hear courteously, to answer wisely, to consider soberly, and to 
decide impartially.”1 An erroneous appointment of an individual of doubtful 
competence as a judge on the basis of political or personal favoritism is 
bound to produce irreparable damage not only to the fair administration 
of justice, but also to the public’s faith in the administration of justice. 
Litigants come to courts of law to have their disputes adjudicated with the 
expectation that judges are impartial and independent and will administer 
justice according to law without taking into account any extraneous or 
irrelevant considerations. This kind of faith and trust will erode if judges 
are appointed on considerations other than their merit. It can hardly be 
expected that after a judge, appointed on the consideration of political 
allegiance, “takes oath, there is a sudden transformation and he forgets his 
past connections and turns a new leaf of life.”2 In this context, the observations 
of Enid Campbell and HP Lee are noteworthy: 
  
 
 1.  Justice Steven H. David, Four Things: Socrates and the Indiana Judiciary, 46 
IND. L. REV. 871, 871 (2013) (acknowledging the Socrates quote is commonly cited in 
judicial readings despite an unknown original source). 
 2.  M. Ehteshamul Bari, The Natural Death of the Supreme Judicial Commission 
of Bangladesh and the Consequent Patronage Appointments to the Bench: Advocating the 
Establishment of an Independent Judicial Commission, 1 INT’L REV. OF L. 1, 15 (2014) 
[hereinafter Bari, The Natural Death]. 
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Judicial independence can . . . be subverted by the appointment of persons who 
do not possess an outstanding level of professional ability, intellectual capacity 
and experience and integrity, and who cannot shake off a sense of gratitude to the 
appointing authority. It is . . . in the interests of the . . . people [not] to have their 
judicial tribunals reduced to timorous institutions.3 
Therefore, it is evident that a government has the utmost duty to ensure that 
individuals of the highest caliber are appointed as judges. 
By following in the footsteps of most common law countries, Bangladesh 
has adopted the method of appointing judges of superior courts by the head 
of the state, which may thereby allow the intrusion of politics in the selection 
process. This article will first examine the provisions of the Constitution 
of Bangladesh relating to the appointment of the Chief Justice of Bangladesh 
and the judges of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, 
this article will discuss the establishment of the convention of appointing 
the senior most judge of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court as 
the Chief Justice of Bangladesh and the violation of this convention on 
numerous occasions since June 2003. In addition, this article will explore 
the convention of appointing the senior most judges of the High Court 
Division as the judges of the Appellate Division and the violation of this 
on several occasions. The objective of these analyses is to demonstrate 
that contravention of the principle of seniority in the selection of the Chief 
Justice and the judges of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court has 
emerged as the most convenient means for succeeding regimes, particularly 
the current one, to politicize the superior judiciary of Bangladesh. Finally, 
recommendations will be put forward for ensuring that political considerations 
no longer play a part in the appointment of the Chief Justice and the judges 
of the Appellate Division. 
II.  THE APPOINTMENT OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF BANGLADESH 
Before making any comment on the method of appointing the Chief 
Justice of Bangladesh, it would be apposite to touch upon the manner in 
which the Chief Justice of the highest court is appointed in different countries 
of the world. The methods followed in various jurisdictions for appointing 
the Chief Justice can be grouped into the following four categories: 
  
 
 3.  E. CAMPBELL & H.P. LEE, AUSTRALIAN JUDICIARY 95 (2001). 
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1.  Appointment by the head of the state either: 
 a) unilaterally as in Ireland, Kenya, Sri Lanka, and Sudan;4 
 b) on the advice of the Prime Minister as in Malta and Western Samoa;5 
 c) on the advice of the Prime Minister after consultation with the Attorney  
General or the leader of the opposition, as in Fiji, and Trinidad and Tobago, 
respectively;6 
 d) on the advice of the Prime Minister after consulting the Conference of 
Rulers, as in Malaysia;7 
 e) on the advice of the Cabinet, as in Greece;8 
 f) with the consent of the Parliament, as in South Korea and Puerto Rico;9 
 
 4.  BUNREACHT NA HÉIREANN [IRISH CONSTITUTION], Dec. 29, 1937, art. 35(1) 
(“The Judges of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the President.”); THE CONSTITUTION 
OF KENYA, Aug. 27, 2010, art. 166(1)(a) (“The President shall appoint-the Chief Justice 
. . . in accordance with the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission. . .”); THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA, Sept. 7, 1978, art. 
107(1) (“The Chief Justice . . .*[shall, subject to the provisions of Article 41C, be 
appointed by the President by warrant under his hand].”); CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC 
OF SUDAN, July 1, 1998, art. 104(1) (“The President of the Republic shall appoint the Chief 
Justice and his deputies according to the law.”). 
 5.  CONSTITUTION OF MALTA, Sept. 21, 1964, art. 95(6) (“The judges of the Superior 
Courts shall be a Chief Justice and such number of other judges. . .”) art. 96(1) (“The 
judges of the Superior Courts shall be appointed by the President acting in accordance 
with the advice of the Prime Minister.”); THE CONSTITUTION OF THE INDEPENDENT STATE 
OF WESTERN SAMOA, Oct. 28, 1960, art. 65(2) (“The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
shall be appointed by the Head of State, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister.”). 
 6.  THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF FIJI, arts. 98, 106 (“The Supreme Court 
consists of the Chief Justice, who is the President of the Supreme Court—The Chief Justice 
is appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister following consultation 
by the Prime Minister with the Attorney-General.”); CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 1976, art. 102 (“The Chief Justice shall be appointed by the 
President after consultation with the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition.”). 
 7.  See LAWS OF MALAYSIA FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, Aug. 31, 1957, art. 122B 
(incorporating all amendments up to 2006) (stating that the Chief Justice of the Federal 
Court shall be appointed by the Head of the State acting on the advice of the Prime 
Minister, after consulting the Conference of Rulers). 
 8.  1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] 90(5) (Greece) (“Promotion to the 
post of President or Vice President of the Supreme Administrative Court, of the Supreme 
Civil and Criminal Court and of the Court of Audit shall be effected by presidential decree 
issued on the proposal of the Cabinet, by selection from among the among the members 
of the respective supreme court, as specified by law.”). 
 9.  1948 DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION ] July 17, 1948, 
art. 104(1) (S. Kor.) (“The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is appointed by the President 
with the consent of the National Assembly.”); PUERTO RICO CONST. of 1952, art. V, § 8 
(“Justices of the Supreme Court shall not assume office until after confirmation by the 
Senate and shall hold their offices during good behavior.”). 
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 g) on obtaining the agreement of the leader of the opposition, often called 
the “Minority Leader,” as in Guyana;10 
 h) on the proposal or recommendation of, or in consultation with, an 
independent selection body such as judicial council or national judicial 
commission or judicial service commission/constitutional council or high 
council of justice, as in Armenia, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Namibia, 
Nepal, and Nigeria;11 or 
 i) in consultation with the judges of superior courts, as in India.12 
2. Appointment by the parliament upon proposal or nomination or recommendation 
by the head of the states as in Croatia, Ethiopia, and Russia;13 
 
 10.  CONSTITUTION OF THE CO-OPERATIVE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA, Feb. 20, 1980, art. 
127(1) (“[T]he Chief Justice shall be appointed by the President acting after the 
consultation with the Minority Leader.”). 
 11.  See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA, May, 7, 1995, art. 95, § 3. 
(providing that  the President of the Court of Appeals shall be appointed on the proposal 
of the Judicial Council); KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ Z DNIA 2 KWIETNIA 
1997 R. [CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND] Apr. 7, 1997, art. 144, sec. 3(1) 
(“The First President of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the President of the 
Republic from amongst candidates proposed by the General Assembly of the Judges of 
the Supreme Court”); see BASIC LAW OF THE GOVERNMENT (1992), art. 52 (Saudi Arabia) 
(stipulating that the appointment of judges, including the Chief Justice, by Royal Decree 
upon a proposal from the Higher Council of Justice); see CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA, 
Boletín Oficial del Estado, n.123(2), Aug. 27, 1978 (Spain) (providing that the President 
of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the King at the proposal of the General Council 
of the judicial branch); see CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA, Mar. 21, 1990, 
art. 82(1) (stating that the appointment of the Judge-President of the High Court shall be 
“made by the President on recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission.”); see 
NĒPĀLAKŌ SANVIDHĀNA [CONSTITUTION OF NEPAL], Sept. 20, 2015, art. 129(2) (providing 
that the President shall appoint the Chief Justice of Nepal on the recommendation of the 
Constitutional Council); CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), art. 231(1) (“The appointment 
of a person to the office of Chief Justice of Nigeria shall be made by the President on the 
recommendation of the National Judicial Council subject to confirmation of such 
appointment by the Senate.”). 
 12.  See INDIA CONST. art 124(2) (providing that every judge of the Supreme Court 
shall be appointed by the President after consultation with “Judges of the Supreme Court 
and of the High Court in the States as the President may deem necessary for the purpose.”). 
 13.  See USTAV REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE [CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA] 
Dec. 22, 1990, art. 119 (amended 2010) (providing that the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court shall be “appointed by the Croatian Parliament at the proposal of the President of 
the Republic with a prior opinion of the general session of the Supreme Court of the Republic 
of Croatia and of the authorized committee of the Croatian Parliament.”); CONSTITUTION 
OF ETHIOPIA, art. 81(1) (“The President and Vice-President of the Federal Supreme Court 
shall, upon recommendation by the Prime Minister, be appointed by the House of Peoples’ 
Representatives.”); see KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] 
art. 128, § 1 (Russ.) (stipulating that the judges of the Supreme Court of the Russia Federation 
shall be appointed by the Federal Council following nomination by the President of the 
Russian Federation); DRUK-GI CHA-THRIMS-CHEN-MO [CONSTITUTION OF BHUTAN], art. 21(4) 
(“The Chief Justice of Bhutan shall be appointed from among the Judges of the Supreme 
Court or from among eminent jurists in consultation with the National Judicial Commission.”); 
see S. AFR. CONST., 1996, art. 174(3) (stating that the President, after consulting the Judicial 
Service Commission, appoint the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeal). 
BARI (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2017  2:24 PM 
[VOL. 18:  33, 2016]  Convenient Means to a Politicized Bench 
  SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 
 39 
3. Election of the Chief Justice by the judges of the Supreme Court as in Belgium, 
Denmark, and Ukraine;14  
4. Election of the Chief Justice by the Parliament upon nomination or proposal 
or recommendation by the head of the state as in Georgia, Hungary, Rwanda, 
Serbia, and Montenegro.15 
Therefore, it is evident that there are four broad modalities prevalent in 
different jurisdictions for appointing the Chief Justice. A large number of 
countries have resorted to using the specific method of appointment by 
the head of the state on the basis of proposal or recommendation of or in 
consultation with an independent judicial or advisory body. This method 
is followed by the procedure to appoint by the head of the state on the 
advice of the prime minister or cabinet or on the agreement of the leader 
of the opposition. Since the Chief Justice symbolizes and epitomizes the 
independence of the judiciary, his appointment cannot be left to the exclusive 
discretion of the executive, for doing so would pave the way for the intrusion 
of political considerations into the process. Accordingly, only a handful 
of countries, namely Ireland, Kenya, Sri Lanka, and Sudan, have bestowed 
upon the head of the state the exclusive power to appoint the head of the 
judiciary. 
 
 14.  See 1994 CONST. art. 151, § 5 (Belg.) (providing that the Court of Cassation and 
the High Courts’ choose within themselves their Presidents and Vice-Presidents); GRUNDLOVEN 
[CONSTITUTION OF DENMARK], June 5, 1953, LOV NR. 59(2) (“The High Court of the Realm 
shall elect a President from among its members.”); See КОНСТИТУЦІЯ УКРАЇНИ [CONSTITUTION 
OF UKRAINE], Dec. 8, 2004, art. 128 (stating that the Chairman of the Supreme Court of 
Ukraine is elected to office by the Plenary Assembly of the Supreme Court of Ukraine by 
secret ballot). 
 15. See SAKARTVELOS K’ONSTITUTSIA [CONSTITUTION OF GEORGIA], Aug. 24, 1995, 
art. 90(2) (providing that  the President of the Supreme Court of Georgia shall be elected 
by the Parliament by the majority of the number of the members of Parliament on the 
current nominal list upon the submission of the President of Georgia); see A MAGYAR 
KÖZTÁRSASÁG ALKOTMÁNYA [CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY], Apr. 25, 
2011, art. 24(8) (stating that the Parliament shall elect the President of the Supreme Court 
based on the recommendation and vote made by the President of the  Republic); 
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA, June 4, 2003, art. 147 (“The President of the 
Supreme Court is elected by the Senate . . . from two candidates in respect of each post 
proposed by the President of the Republic after consultation with the cabinet and the Supreme 
Council of the Judiciary); see USTAV REPUBLIKE SRBIJE [CONSTITUTION OF SERBIA] art. 
73(10) (stipulating that the National Assembly shall elect the president of the Supreme 
Court); see CONSTITUTION OF MONTENEGRO, May 21, 2006, art. 124 (stating that the 
President of the Supreme Court shall by elected and dismissed from duty by the Parliament 
at the joint proposal of the President of Montenegro, the speaker of the Parliament and the 
Prime Minister). 
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In Bangladesh, the Chief Justice, designated by the Constitution as “the 
Chief Justice of Bangladesh,”16 is the head of the Bangladeshi Judiciary 
and the paterfamilias of the judicial fraternity. The office of Chief Justice 
is therefore the most dignified and exalted post in the judiciary of Bangladesh, 
being ranked fourth in the Warrant of Precedence.17 
The Chief Justice is the symbol of justice and freedom.18 Thus, the 
appointment of the Chief Justice is of critical importance in the administration 
of justice for retaining public confidence in the impartiality, credibility, and 
reliability of the highest court of the land. The people must be assured that 
the Chief Justice is not appointed because he/she shares the political and 
social philosophy of the party in power, for the Chief Justice is also required 
to adjudicate the lawfulness of the actions of the executive.19 This, therefore, 
necessitates a mechanism, independent of government control, for the 
appointment of the Chief Justice that takes into account well-defined objective 
criteria. As to the importance of the selection and appointment of the Chief 
Justice for ensuring the independence of the judiciary, the observations of 
the former Chief Justice of the Pakistan Supreme Court, Saiduzzaman 
Siddiqui, made in Asad Ali v. Federation of Pakistan20 are noteworthy: 
The selection of a person to the high office of the Chief Justice . . . is a pivotal 
appointment for maintaining the independence of judiciary and for providing a 
free and unobstructed access to impartial and independent Courts/Tribunals to the 
ordinary citizens . . . guaranteed under . . . the Constitution.21 
These realities were indeed ignored and disregarded in 1972 when the 
Constitution of Bangladesh originally provided that “[t]he Chief Justice 
shall be appointed by the President.”22 Thus, the power to appoint the Chief 
Justice was an executive power vested in the President, who, as the 
constitutional head, was duty-bound to exercise this power under Article 
48(3) “in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister.” Later, however, 
the Constitution (Twelfth Amendment) Act of 1991 freed the President 
 
 16.  CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH, Nov. 4, 1972, art. 
94(2) [hereinafter BANGLADESH CONSTITUTION]. 
 17.  Warrant of Precedence, BANGLAPEDIA, (Feb. 5, 2015), http://en.banglapedia.org/ 
index.php?title=Warrant_of_Precedence. 
 18.  The Chief Justice sits only in the Appellate Division, which is one of the two 
divisions (the other being the High Court Division) of the highest court of law in Bangladesh, 
i.e. the Supreme Court. See BANGLADESH CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, art. 94(3). 
 19.  For a general explanation of the realities of judicial independence and accountability, 
see generally Atchison et al, Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability: a Selected 
Biography, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 723, 740–806 (1999) 
 20.  Malik Asad Ali v. Federation of Pakistan, (1998) 50 PLD (SC) 161 (Pak.). 
 21.  Id. at 189. 
 22.  BANGLADESH CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, art. 95(1). 
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from the obligation of consulting with the Prime Minister in appointing 
the Chief Justice of Bangladesh.23 
As a result, the President of Bangladesh has been given a blank cheque 
of unfettered discretion to appoint the Chief Justice of Bangladesh. This 
discretion ignores the benefit of shared responsibility: responsibility preferably 
shared between the President and a selection committee consisting of 
majority members from the superior judiciary, in order to prevent a politically 
motivated appointment for improper motives. 
There are no specific qualifications listed in the Constitution of Bangladesh 
for the appointment of the Chief Justice. Therefore, the qualifications laid 
down in the Constitution for the appointment of judges of the High Court 
Division (HCD) and AD of the Supreme Court are equally applicable in 
case of appointment of the Chief Justice of Bangladesh. As to the criteria 
for selecting the Supreme Court Judges, the Constitution originally provided 
that: 
(2) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a judge unless he is a citizen 
of Bangladesh and – 
 a) has for not less than ten years been an advocate of the Supreme Court; or 
 b) has, for not less than ten years, held judicial office or an advocate in the 
territory of Bangladesh and has, for not less than three years, exercised 
the power of a District Judge.24 
The Constitution thus provided for the appointment of judges to the 
Supreme Court both from the bench and the bar. Under the original provision, 
only a citizen of Bangladesh, not a foreigner, could be appointed as a judge 
of the Supreme Court provided he fulfilled one of the three qualifications 
mentioned above. 
Ordinarily, an advocate who has practiced before the subordinate courts 
in Bangladesh for a period of two years may be enrolled as an advocate of 
the Supreme Court25 and would subsequently be eligible for appointment as 
a judge of the Supreme Court after practicing before the Supreme Court 
for a period of not less than 10 years. In 1977, the provisions for appointing 
an advocate having the experience of practicing before the subordinate 
 
 23.  See id., amended art. 48(3) (amended 1991) (“In exercise of all his functions, 
save only that of appointing the Prime Minister pursuant to clause (3) of art. 56 and the 
Chief Justice pursuant to clause 1 of art. 95, the President shall act in accordance with the 
advice of the Prime Minister.”). 
 24.  Id. art. 95(2). 
 25.  See Bangladesh Legal Practitioners and Bar Council Order, 1972, art. 21(2). 
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courts for not less than 10 years and of exercising the powers of a district 
judge for not less than three years, was done away with by an amendment 
to the Constitution.26 Furthermore, that same amendment replaced the 
requirement of acting as a district judge with the stipulation of serving as 
a judicial officer for at least 10 years for appointment as a judge of the 
Supreme Court. Therefore, under the existing arrangement of the Constitution, 
an advocate having 10 years in practice before the Supreme Court or a 
judicial officer having not less than 10 years of experience shall be qualified 
for a berth in the apex court of the country. 
It is noticeable that the Constitution does not prescribe any guidelines 
as to the academic qualification, professional ability, reputation, or integrity 
necessary for the selection of the Supreme Court advocates and judicial 
officers as judges of the Supreme Court. Consequently, any Supreme Court 
advocate having no standing practice (for example, those who only kept 
his enrollment updated by paying the prescribed fees without going to the 
Court or those having no experience of handling crucial cases, but rather 
only moved simple matters like bail or stay petitions) can be appointed as 
a judge of the Supreme Court. In the same vein, the Constitution is silent 
as to the criteria (for example, seniority, disposal of cases in an efficient 
manner, maintenance of good relationship with colleagues and the bar), 
which should be kept in mind in appointing a judicial officer as a judge of 
the Supreme Court. Thus, any judge of a subordinate court who has served 
the court for at least 10 years without being appointed as a district judge 
 the head of a District Court—can theoretically be appointed as a judge 
of the Supreme Court.27 However, no one below the rank of a district judge 
has so far been appointed as a judge of the Supreme Court. 
In 1977, clause (c) was added to Article 95(2) of the Constitution, which 
empowered the Parliament to prescribe by law any other qualifications as 
alternatives to the 10-year requirement as a Supreme Court advocate or a 
judicial officer for appointment as a judge of the Supreme Court.28 To 
date, no such law has been enacted. Subsequently, in the absence of any 
constitutional provision specifying that the Chief Justice is to be appointed 
from amongst the judges of the AD, it can strongly be argued that any 
advocate of the Supreme Court or any judicial officer having fulfilled the 
 
 26.  See CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH, amended by 
The Constitution (Tenth Amendment) Act, 1990. 
 27.  In this context, it is noteworthy that for the appointment of a district judge, a judicial 
officer requires at least ten years of experience including three years’ experience as a joint 
district judge or both as a joint district judge and additional district judge. See Bangladesh 
Civil Service Recruitment (1995 Amendment) Rules, 1981, Ordinance No. 087, pt. XXII. 
 28.  See CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH, art. 95(2)(c), 
amended by The Constitution (Tenth Amendment) Act, 1990. 
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qualifications laid down in Article 95(2) of the Constitution can directly 
be appointed as the Chief Justice of Bangladesh. 
The appointment of the Chief Justice has been left at the pleasure of the 
President, who is not supposed to know the “judicial track record” of the 
judges of the AD, e.g. their performance in handling and conducting cases 
including cases of constitutional importance, their keen intellect, legal 
acumen, integrity, and reputation. In fact, it is the Ministry of Law, Justice, 
and Parliamentary Affairs that initiates the proposal through the Prime 
Minister, recommending the senior-most judge of the AD for the appointment 
as the Chief Justice whenever vacancy occurs in that office. The President 
ordinarily approves the proposal, and this convention of appointing the 
senior-most judge of the AD as the Chief Justice was consistently observed 
in Bangladesh until June 2003, with the exception of an abortive attempt 
made by the former President H. M. Ershad in January 1990. 
After the retirement of Chief Justice Badrul Haider Chowdhury, President 
Ershad appointed the senior-most Judge of the AD, Justice Shahabuddin 
Ahmed, as the Acting Chief Justice instead of appointing him as the regular 
Chief Justice under Article 97 of the Constitution.29 This appointment evoked 
sharp reactions from the Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA).30 The 
SCBA demanded an immediate return to the tradition of appointing the 
senior most Judge of the AD to the office of the Chief Justice of Bangladesh.31 
After thirteen days, Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed was appointed as the sixth 
regular Chief Justice of the country.32 
III.  VIOLATION OF THE CONVENTION OF SENIORITY IN APPOINTING 
CHIEF JUSTICE OF BANGLADESH 
The convention or tradition of appointing the senior-most judge of the 
AD as the Chief Justice of Bangladesh has been violated by the regimes 
of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)– Jamaat-e-Islami Alliance (2001–
2006), the Non-Party Caretaker Government (2006–2008), and the Bangladesh 
 
 29.  See M. Ehteshamul Bari, The Substantive Independence of the Superior Judiciary 
Under the Constitutions of Bangladesh and Malaysia: A Comparative Study 123 (2011) 
(unpublished L.L.M. Thesis, University of Malaya) (on file with author and the Ahmad 
Ibrahim Library, University of Malaya) [hereinafter Bari, The Substantive Independence 
of the Superior Judiciary]. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
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Awami League (2009-to-date). An attempt will now be made to critically 
examine these instances of supersessions. 
A.  Supersession During the Regime of the BNP-Jamaat                              
Alliance (2001–2006) 
The convention of seniority was first violated on June 23, 2003, by the 
regime of the BNP-Jamaat Alliance when Justice K.M. Hasan was appointed 
as the Chief Justice of Bangladesh in supersession of two fellow colleagues, 
Justices Md. Ruhul Amin and Md. Fazlul Karim. It should be pointed out 
that both Justices Amin and Karim had been elevated to the AD superseding 
Justice Hasan, the senior-most judge of the HCD, by ignoring the 
recommendation of the Chief Justice.33 The Government justified the 
supersession of Justices Amin and Karim in appointing the Chief Justice 
by terming it as a corrective measure aimed at providing redress to the 
earlier injustice that had been perpetrated on Justice Hasan. 
The next violation took place after the retirement of Chief Justice Hasan 
on January 26, 2004, when Justice JR Mudassir Husain was appointed as 
the Chief Justice of Bangladesh on January 27, 2004, in preference to the 
same two judges—Justices Amin and Karim—who had also superseded him 
in getting berth on the AD.34 This supersession was also justified in the same 
vein as it had been done on the previous occasion. 
However, contrary to the justifications put forward by the regime, it seems 
the objective behind these supersessions was to secure the appointment of 
Justice Hasan as the head of the Non-Party “Care-taker” Government, which, 
in pursuance of the Constitution, would have been formed in October 2006, 
following the dissolution of the Parliament.35 Immediately following the 
 
 33.  See KM Hasan new CJ, 4 THE DAILY STAR 26 (June 23, 2003) (explaining how 
Justice KM Hasan had been superseded twice by the Awami League Government during 
1996–2001: first on January 9, 2000, in elevating Justice Rabbani and Justice Ruhul Amin, 
and again on May 15, 2001 in elevating Justice Md. Fazlul Karim to the AD. Staff 
Correspondent), http://archive.thedailystar.net/2003/06/23/d3062301033.htm (last accessed 
Nov. 4, 2016). 
 34.  Bari, The Substantive Independence of the Superior Judiciary, supra note 29, at 124. 
 35.  The Chapter on “Non-Party Care-taker” Government was inserted in the 
Constitution of Bangladesh through an amendment, i.e., the Constitution (Thirteenth 
Amendment) Act, 1996, due to the distrust that exists between the two main political 
parties, i.e. the BNP and the BAL, with regard to conducting a free, fair and impartial 
general election under the supervision of a political government. It was expected that a 
Non-Party “Care-taker” Government, headed by the last retired Chief Justice and 10 Advisers 
appointed by the President among eminent citizens of the country, due to its neutral character 
would have no incentive to manipulate the results of a general election. Consequently, the 
elections held under the supervision of “Care-taker” governments in 1996, 2001 and 2008 
were widely lauded as free and fair.  BANGLADESH CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, former 
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retirement of Chief Justice Hasan, the retirement age of Supreme Court 
judges was raised by the regime from 65 to 67. This maneuver ensured that 
Justice JR Mudassir Husain would continue as the Chief Justice beyond 
the general election scheduled for January 2007, thereby making Justice 
Hasan the first option to head the Care-taker Government in his capacity 
as the last retired Chief Justice of the country. The ruling party went to 
great lengths to ensure that Justice Hasan was constitutionally destined to 
head the next Care-taker Government, perhaps on the belief that he would 
be willing to unduly influence the outcome of the election in the party’s 
favor due to his past ties.36 
B.  Supersession During the Non-Party Care-taker                            
Government (2007–2008) 
During the regime of the Non-Party Care-taker Government, due to Justice 
Hasan’s refusal to accept the position of the Chief Adviser amidst the violent 
opposition that the Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) had staged to oppose 
his appointment,37 and subsequently by Dr. Fakhruddin,38 President Iajuddin 
Ahmed, appointed Justice M.M. Ruhul Amin as the 16th Chief Justice of 
Bangladesh in supersession of the senior-most judge of the AD, Justice Fazlul 
Karim. 
The President of the SCBA, Barrister Shafique Ahmed, expressed his 
dissatisfaction and disapproval of such supersession: 
Although supersession has also taken place in appointing Chief Justice and Appellate 
Division Judges during the past governments, the Bar has never accepted such 
supersession . . . such supersession has led the people concerned to apprehend 
political ill-detention of the government.39 
 
arts. 58C(1), 58C(2)–(3), 58D(2); and 123(3), as had been inserted by the Constitution 
(Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 1996. . . . 
 36.  Justice K.M. Hasan had served as the International Affairs Secretary of the BNP 
in 1979 and was subsequently appointed as an Ambassador to Iraq during the first regime 
of the BNP. KM Hasan Was Involved in BNP Politics, 5 THE DAILY STAR 825 (Sept. 21, 
2006), http://archive.thedailystar.net/2006/09/21/d6092101022.htm. 
 37.  Shakhawat Liton, President sworn in as Chief of Caretaker Govt, 5 THE DAILY 
STAR 851(Oct. 30, 2006), http://archive.thedailystar.net/2006/10/30/d6103001011.htm. 
 38.  Head of New Bangladesh Interim Government Sworn in, ABC NEWS (Jan. 12, 
2007, 6:16 AM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2007-01-13/head-of-new-bangladesh-interim- 
government-sworn-in/2171380. 
 39.  Bari, The Substantive Independence of the Superior Judiciary, supra note 29, at 125. 
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Consequently, the SCBA broke its tradition of welcoming the new Chief 
Justice when it refrained from felicitating Justice M.M. Ruhul Amin on 
his first appearance in the Court on June 1, 2008 as the Chief Justice.40 
C.  Supersession During the Present BAL Government (2009-to-date) 
Within two years of entering office, the present BAL Government violated 
the principle of seniority in appointing the Chief Justice on two occasions: 
first in December 2009 and then again in September 2010. On December 
23, 2009, President Zillur Rahman appointed Justice Md. Tafazzul Islam41 
as the Chief Justice of Bangladesh in supersession of the senior-most 
judge of the AD, Justice Mohammad Fazlul Karim.42 Thus, Justice Karim 
became the victim of supersession for the fourth time. It is ironic that the 
then-President of the SCBA who, as pointed out above in III.B, in May 
2008 had criticized and disapproved the appointment of Justice M.M. 
Ruhul Amin as the Chief Justice of Bangladesh during the regime of the 
Non-Party Care-taker Government in supersession of the senior-most judge 
of the AD, Justice Karim, had a complete change of heart as the Minister 
for Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs of the regime of the BAL when 
he proposed Justice Islam’s appointment as the Chief Justice of Bangladesh, 
thereby ignoring the same senior judge. 
The President again violated the principle of seniority on September 26, 
2010, when he appointed Justice A.B.M Khairul Haque, succeeding 
Justice Fazlul Karim, as the 19th Chief Justice of the country ahead of his 
two senior colleagues in the AD.43 Justice Haque had: a) been appointed 
as an additional and regular judge of the HCD in 1998 and 2000 respectively 
by the then BAL Government, b) upheld a lower court’s verdict sentencing 
15 killers of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his family as one 
of the members of the Death-Reference Bench of the HCD, c) delivered, 
as a judge of the HCD, the judgment declaring the Constitution (Fifth 
Amendment) Act, 1979, which was passed to ratify and confirm all the 
actions of the first Martial Law Regime (1975–1979) unconstitutional, and 
 
 40.  Id.; New CJ Takes Oath, THE DAILY STAR (June 2, 2008), http://archive.thedailystar. 
net/newDesign/latest_news.php?nid=39301. 
 41.  Justice Md. Tafazzul Islam headed the five-member special bench of the AD 
that pronounced the landmark verdict in the Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (former 
President of the country and father of the present Prime Minister) murder case, which 
upheld the death sentences imposed by the HCD for 12 of the accused. Tafazzul New Chief 
Justice, THE DAILY STAR (Dec. 16, 2009), http://archive.thedailystr.net/newDesign/print 
_news.php?nid=117925. 
 42.  Outgoing CJ Slated at Farewell, THE DAILY STAR (Sept. 30, 2010 12:00 AM), 
http://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-156579. 
 43.  Justice Khairul Haque new chief justice, THE DAILY STAR (Sept. 27, 2010), http:// 
www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-156149. 
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d) been elevated to the AD in July 2009 by the present BAL regime.44 In 
light of these factors, Chief Justice Khairul Haque’s appointment had been 
stigmatized and branded as a politically motivated appointment by legal 
and political circles.45 The President and the Secretary-General of the 
SCBA also maintained its tradition of protesting and criticizing the 
supersession of the two senior judges, who considered it dignified to go 
on leave.46 In fact, they termed the “appointment as politically motivated,” 
which had the effect of tarnishing “the image of the apex court”.47 
Furthermore, it can be argued that, by appointing a judge who was ranked 
third in the seniority list as the Chief Justice, the Government might have 
had two hidden agendas, namely, an immediate plan and an ultimate plan. 
The immediate plan was to secure the administration of oath to the two 
additional judges who were accused of committing serious offences in the 
past—one was the prime-accused in a murder case while the other had 
allegedly kicked on the door of the Chief Justice’s office on November 30, 
2006.48 Chief Justice Haque’s predecessor, Chief Justice Fazlul Karim, had 
declined to do so citing “unavoidable reasons.”49 This plan was executed 
in November 2010 when Chief Justice Haque administered oath to the 
previously mentioned judges in discharge of his “constitutional obligation.”50 
The ultimate plan was to secure the declaration of the Constitution (13th 
Amendment) Act, 1996, which had inserted the provisions concerning the 
Care-taker Government into the Constitution, unconstitutional, so as to 
ensure that the general election scheduled for January 2014 was held under 
the BAL’s supervision.51 This plan came to fruition when an appeal was 
preferred against the decision of the HCD in M. Saleem Ullah v. Bangladesh,52 
upholding the validity of the insertion of the provisions concerning the 
 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  M. Abdul Latif Mondal, Averting controversy in appointment of Chief Justice, 
THE DAILY STAR (Oct. 10, 2010), http://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-157772. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  See Murder Case Against Ruhul Quddus Stayed, THE DAILY STAR (July 27, 
2010), http://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-148395; see also Controversial 2 Left Out 
of Oath, THE DAILY STAR, Apr. 18, 2010, http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/print 
_news.php?nid=134740. 
 49.  Ashutosh Sarkar, 4 HC Judges Sworn in: Oath of 2 Angers Pro-BNP Lawyers, 
THE DAILY STAR (Nov. 5, 2010), http://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-161341. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  See SC Sets Aside Caretaker Gov’t System, BANGLADESH LAW HOUSE (June 10, 
2011), http://bdlawhouse.blogspot.com.au/2011/06/sc-sets-aside-caretaker-govt-system.html. 
 52.  M. Saleem Ullah v. Bangladesh, (2005) 57 DLR 171 (HCD), 171, 173. 
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Care-taker Government by the above amendment into the Constitution. It 
should be stressed here that the HCD had reasoned that, instead of affecting 
or destroying any basic structure or feature of the Constitution, the 
incorporation of the Chapter on Care-taker Government had strengthened 
democracy through the facilitation of three free and fair general elections 
in the years 1996, 2001 and 2008 respectively.53 However, on appeal, Chief 
Justice Haque, in delivering the majority judgment in Abdul Mannan Khan v 
Bangladesh,54 prospectively declared the constitutional amendment concerning 
the Care-taker Government unconstitutional notwithstanding its effectiveness 
in promoting democracy in Bangladesh, which is evident from the above 
credible elections held under its supervision. Instead of the full judgment, 
a “short order” of Justice Haque,55 which was merely one-page long, 
was issued on May 10, 2011, eight days before he went into retirement. 
Furthermore, the precise reasoning for this decision was not contained in 
the short order. However, contrary to the decision of declaring the amendment 
to be unconstitutional, the order also recommended the holding of the 
general elections scheduled for 2014 and 2019 under the supervision of 
Non-Party Care-taker Governments in pursuance of the provisions inserted 
by the Thirteenth Amendment on the basis of the “old age principles,” 
namely, quod alias non est licitum, necessitas lecitum facit (necessity 
makes lawful what is otherwise considered unlawful) and salus populi 
suprema lex (the safety of the people is considered the supreme law).56 It 
seems that this recommendation was given by Chief Justice Haque in 
order to keep open the door for himself to head the next Care-taker 
Government as he would have been the last retired Chief Justice before 
the 2014 general election. 
The short order of Justice Haque had a profound adverse impact on the 
political landscape of the country. The government of BAL, in overlooking 
the recommendation of retaining the system of Care-taker government for 
the supervision of next two general elections, focused solely on the declaration 
of the Thirteenth Amendment as being ultra vires the Constitution. 
Subsequently, without considering it wise to wait for the release of the 
full judgment to contemplate on the reasoning put forward by the court, 
the BAL within 53 days of the publication of the short order, on July 3, 
2011, used its overwhelming majority in the Parliament to get the Constitution 
(Fifteenth Amendment) Act of 2011 passed, which repealed the Chapter 
 
 53.  See Abdul Mannan Khan v. Bangladesh, C.A. No. 139/2005 with C.P. No. 596/2005, 
535, 641, 720, 722. 
 54.  See id. at 349, 747. 
 55.  See SC Sets Aside Caretaker Gov’t System, supra note 51. 
 56.  See id. 
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on “Non-Party Care-taker Government” contained in the Constitution.57 
This amendment subsequently facilitated the holding of a virtually voter-
less and one-sided election in January 2014, thereby perpetuating BAL’s 
grip on power.58 The BNP, the principal opposition party, and its allies 
boycotted the election over their concern that it would be rigged in the 
absence of a neutral caretaker regime overseeing the electoral process.59 
Secondly, due to opposition boycott, the BAL and its allies had managed 
to win unopposed 154 seats out of the total 300, thereby holding the 
simple majority required to return to power and depriving, in the process, 
approximately 48 million registered voters in these electorates their right 
to vote.60 Following the elections in the remaining 146 seats, wherein only 
around 20 percent61 of the registered voters turned out to vote, the BAL 
had managed to win a total of 234 seats on its own. Subsequently, the BAL 
persuaded General HM Ershad’s Jatiya Party (JP), which was one of its 
principal allies in the Grand Alliance that it had formed before the general 
election in 2008 and which had won 34 seats, to act as the opposition party 
in the parliament.62 However, the credibility of the JP as an effective 
opposition party is undermined by the fact that three of its lawmakers are 
cabinet ministers while its head, Ershad, is the special envoy to the Prime 
Minister enjoying the rank and status of a cabinet minister.63 Thus, in light 
of these facts, it is evident that the parliament resultant from the 2014 general 
election is not only devoid of any real opposition but is also subservient 
to the executive as it is the only parliament in the world where members 
of the opposition are also members of the executive branch. 
The full judgment of the Court was written by Justice Haque more than 
a year after he had retired as the Chief Justice of Bangladesh and was 
 
 57.  See CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH, art. 21, amended by 
The Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act 2001. 
 58.  Q&A: Bangladesh General Elections, BBC NEWS (Jan. 3, 2014), http://www.bbc. 
com/news/uk-25584962. 
 59.  Id.; Clashes and Boycott Mar Bangladesh Election, BBC NEWS (Jan. 5, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-25602436; Ellen Barry, Low Turnout in Bangladesh 
Elections Amid Boycott and Violence, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/01/06/world/asia/boycott-and-violence-mar-elections-in-bangladesh.html. 
 60.  Barry, Low Turnout in Bangladesh Elections, supra note 59, at A4. 
 61.  ALI RIAZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO SOUTH ASIAN POLITICS 68 (Neil DeVotta ed., 
2016). 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  See id. at 70. 
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subsequently made public on September 16, 201264—16 months after the 
issuance of the short order. Paradoxically, this judgment was devoid of 
any reference to the earlier recommendation contained in the short order 
underlying the necessity of holding the elections of 2014 and 2019 under 
the supervision of the Non-Party Care-taker governments.65 Rather, it was 
stated that the future general elections should be supervised by caretaker 
governments comprising of elected representatives.66 This deviation from 
the short order was sought to be justified on the basis that the Thirteenth 
amendment permitted a group of unelected individuals to run the affairs 
of the country during the interim period between the dissolution of the 
Parliament and the general elections, which was not only undemocratic 
but was also contradictory to the basic structure of the Constitution.67 
To this end, Justice Haque relied on the preamble and Article 56 of the 
Constitution. The preamble of the Constitution lists the “absolute trust and 
faith” in democracy as one of the driving forces behind the war for national 
independence from former West Pakistan.68 In addition, Article 56 of the 
Constitution provides that if the necessity arises in the interim period 
between ‘a dissolution of Parliament’ and the next general elections for 
the appointment of the Prime Minister and other members of the Cabinet, 
such appointments should be made only from those persons who were 
members of the Parliament “immediately before the dissolution.”69 Thus 
it seems that Justice Haque had written the majority judgment in a manner 
very much in line with the changes brought forth by the regime of BAL 
through the Fifteenth Amendment Act of 2011. It is further evident that 
the deletion of the Care-taker Government, on the basis of Justice Haque’s 
contention that it went against the democratic fiber of the Constitution, 
has facilitated Bangladesh’s lapse into a one-party dictatorship. 
On July 23, 2013, 10 months after the publication of the full judgment 
in the Thirteenth Amendment case, the government appointed Justice Haque 
as the Chairman of the Law Commission for a period of three years with 
the rank, status, salary, allowance, and other benefits equivalent to those 
 
 64.  See Full Judgment of 13th Amendment Published, BDNEWS24.COM (Sept. 16, 
2012), http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2012/09/16/full-judgment-of-13th-amendment-
published. 
 65.  See generally Abdul Mannan Khan v. Bangladesh, C.A. No. 139/2005. 
 66.  See id. at 14. 
 67.  See id. at 383. 
 68.  THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH, Nov. 4, 1972, 
(Bangl.). 
 69.  Abdul Mannan Khan v. Bangladesh, Civil Appeal No. 139 of 2005 with Civil 
Petition for Leave to Appeal No. 596 of 2005, 385 (Bangl.). 
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of the Chief Justice of the country.70 This appointment gave the impression 
to the politically-conscious citizens of the country that Justice Haque was 
being rewarded for his services in ensuring that the BAL had perpetuated 
its grip on power. 
The violation of the principle of seniority in appointing the Chief Justice 
not only causes injustice to the superseded judges by shattering their 
legitimate expectation71 of becoming Chief Justice, but also makes room 
for further injustices likely to be meted out in the future against the litigants, 
particularly in cases where the government is a party. This also has the 
disastrous impact of making the highly dignified and prestigious office of 
the Chief Justice controversial and of lowering public faith, confidence, 
and trust in the impartiality of the highest court of the land. No one can 
calculate the aggregate amount of evil inflicted on the community by such 
a bad decision of supersession. Furthermore, if the superseded judges 
resign in protest or take leave until retirement, as had occurred in India 
when the senior-most judge of the Supreme Court, Justice Hans Raj Khanna, 
resigned from office in 1977 as a mark of protest upon being superseded 
by the regime of Mrs. Indira Gandhi for appointment as the Chief Justice 
of India,72 the country will be deprived of the service of the senior, experienced, 
and competent judges. It can hardly be expected, especially in third world 
countries, that the junior judge appointed as the Chief Justice overlooking 
the claim of his senior colleagues, will refuse to accept such an appointment 
to save the apex court from political clout and controversy. 
IV.  APPOINTMENT OF JUDGES OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION (AD) OF 
THE SUPREME COURT 
The AD is the higher division of the Supreme Court that hears and 
determines appeals against judgment, decrees, orders, and sentences of the 
 
 70.  Ex CJ Khairul Haque Reappointed as Law Commission Chair, THE DAILY STAR 
(July 1, 2016), http://www.thedailystar.net/city/ex-cj-khairul-haque-reappointed-law-
commission-chair-1248835. 
 71.  The doctrine of legitimate expectation, which was introduced for the first time 
by Lord Denning, in the field of judicial review, in Schmidt and Murranti v. Secretary of 
State of Home Affairs [1969] 1 All ER 904; and reiterated in the case of  Attorney General 
of Hong Kong v. Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 ALL ER 346. 
 72.  Anil B. Divan, Cry Freedom, THE INDIAN EXPRESS (Mar. 15, 2004), http://archive. 
indianexpress.com/oldStory/42937/. It is noteworthy that Justice Khanna was superseded 
for his dissenting judgment in Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla 
(popularly known as the Habeas Corpus Case). 
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HCD, the lower division of the Court.73 The judges (along with the Chief 
Justice) appointed to the AD (the maximum number of which has neither 
been determined by the Constitution nor has the Parliament been empowered 
to fix the number of judges) sit only in that division.74 It is the President 
of the Country who has been invested by the Constitution with the power 
of ascertaining the number of the judges of the Supreme Court on the advice 
of the Prime Minister.75 Accordingly, the number of judges to be appointed 
in the AD was initially fixed at five, which was later in 2002 increased to 
7 by the President during the regime of the BNP (2001–2006).76 Finally, 
on July 9, 2009, then-President Zillur Rahman increased the number of 
judges in the AD from seven to 11.77 President Rahman did not specify any 
reasons for increasing the number of judges, such as an increased number 
of cases or the necessity of speedy disposition of cases in order to reduce 
backlog. 
There is also neither any provision in the Constitution of Bangladesh nor 
any Constitutional convention requiring the President to consult the Chief 
Justice who is the most competent and well-equipped person to articulate 
his objective opinion after discussing the matter with the senior colleagues 
and after taking into account the number of cases pending before the AD. 
With regard to the appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court, the 
Constitution of Bangladesh provides that “[t]he . . . judges [of the Supreme 
Court] shall be appointed by the President after consultation with the Chief 
Justice.”78 After consulting the Chief Justice, the President is required under 
 
 73.  THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH, Nov. 4, 1972, 
art. 103(1) (Bangl.). The Appellate Division does not have any original jurisdiction except 
the power subject to law to make an order for the investigation of or punishment for any 
contempt of itself. 
 74.  Id. art. 94(3). 
 75.  Id. arts. 94(2) and 48(3). 
 76.  See Bari, The Natural Death, supra note 2, at 8 (“In October 2001, the Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party came to power and the next year it raised the number of judges in the 
Appellate Division from five to seven.”) 
 77.  Staff Correspondent, SC Appellate Division gets 5 more judges, THE DAILY STAR 
(July 14, 2009, 11:00PM), http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid= 
96998. 
 78.  THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH, Nov. 4, 1972, 
art. 95(1) (It is noteworthy that this stipulation concerning the consultation with the Chief 
Justice had been done away with by the first BAL regime on January 25, 1975 through the 
Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1975. Subsequently, the Martial Law regime of 
1975 issued the Second Proclamation (Seventh Amendment) Order, 1976 on May 28, 
1976, which restored the stipulation of consultation only to have it removed on November 
27, 1977 through the Second Proclamation (Tenth Amendment) Order, 1977. The changes 
brought to Article 95(1) of the Constitution by the Martial Law regime were reaffirmed 
and validated by the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1979. Almost 34 years later in 
July 2011, the present BAL regime restored the original stipulation in Article 95(1) of 
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Article 48(3) of the Constitution to exercise his power of appointing judges 
of both the divisions of the Supreme Court in accordance with the advice 
of the Prime Minister.79 It is evident that this procedure resembles the British 
method of appointing judges of the higher judiciary which was prevalent 
until the enactment of the Constitutional Reforms Act of 2005 and whereby 
the Crown appoints the judges by convention on the advice of the Prime 
Minister after consulting the Lord Chancellor80 in his capacity as the head 
of the judiciary.81 
It is noteworthy that in the Subcontinent, Bangladesh is not the first nation 
to have adopted the method of appointment of judges of superior courts 
after consultation with the Chief Justice. Rather it is the Constitution of India 
of 1950, which, for the first time, provided for this stipulation. Article 124(2) 
provides that the President of India shall consult with the Chief Justice along 
with ‘such of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Court in the 
States as the President may deem necessary82 in appointing judges of the 
Supreme Court. Subsequently, the 1956 and 1962 Constitutions of Pakistan, 
which were abrogated in 1958 and 1969 respectively, adopted the Indian 
method by providing for the appointment of judges of the Supreme Court 
by the President after consultation with the Chief Justice, with the modification 
that he was not required to consult such of the judges of the Supreme Court 
and of the High Courts in the States in his discretion.83 
 
consultation with the Chief Justice in appointing judges of the Supreme Court through the 
Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act 2011.). 
 79.  Id. art. 48(3). 
 80.  OWEN H. PHILIPS & PAUL JACKSON, O. HOOD PHILLIPS’ CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 380–81 (7th ed. 1987). 
 81.  The Lord Chancellor used to sit as the Chief Justice in the Judicial Committee 
of the House of Lords. 
 82.  INDIA CONST. art. 124, § 2 (providing that “Every Judge of the Supreme Court 
shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal after consultation 
with such of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts in the States as the 
President may deem necessary for the purpose and shall hold office until he attains the age 
of sixty-five years: Provided that in the case of appointment of a Judge other than the Chief 
Justice, the Chief Justice of India shall always be consulted. . .”). 
 83.  PAKISTAN CONST. art. 149, § 1 (1956) (provided that “the Chief Justice of 
Pakistan shall be appointed by the President and the other judges of the Supreme Court 
shall be appointed after consultation with the Chief Justice.”); Article 50, § 1 of the Pakistan 
Constitution, like article 149 of the 1956 constitution, provided: “The Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court shall be appointed by the President, and the other Judges shall be appointed 
by the President after consultation with the Chief Justice.”  PAKISTAN CONST. art. 50, § 1 
(1962). 
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This method of appointing judges of the Supreme Court in consultation 
with the Chief Justice, as incorporated into the Constitution of Bangladesh, is 
very much in line with the suggestion of the International Congress of 
Jurists that, whatever body actually makes judicial appointment, it is desirable 
that the Judiciary should itself cooperate or at least be consulted.84 
Since the President (as a layman) could have no knowledge about the 
legal acumen, legal expertise, independence and firmness, ability to handle 
cases and personal conduct of advocates or subordinate judicial officers, 
the requirement of consulting the Chief Justice who would have expert 
knowledge about the ability, competency and suitability of an advocate or 
a judicial officer for judgeship, was provided for ensuring the selection of 
the most appropriate person for appointment. Apart from fulfilling the 
general qualification requirements as laid down in Article 95(2) of the 
Constitution, e.g., citizenship of Bangladesh and either experience as an 
advocate of the Supreme Court for not less than 10 years or experience as 
a judicial officer for not less than 10 years as mentioned earlier in II, there 
is no other pre-requisite provided for either by the Constitution or by any 
other law. Therefore, theoretically it is possible that any advocate or any 
judicial officer, who fulfils the prescribed Constitutional requisites, can 
directly be appointed as a judge of the AD without being a judge of the 
HCD. But in practice, no such advocate or judicial officer, except HCD 
judges, has yet been appointed directly as a judge of the AD of the Supreme 
Court. Rather a convention has developed to provide flesh to clothe the 
dry bone of the Constitution to the effect that the appointment of judges 
to the AD of the Supreme Court shall be made from amongst the judges of 
the HCD on the basis of seniority. 
V.  VIOLATION OF THE CONVENTION OF SENIORITY IN APPOINTING 
JUDGES OF THE AD 
The convention of following seniority in appointing judges of the AD 
was consistently followed for about four years from December 16, 1972 
to August 12, 1976. But since August 13, 1976, this convention has been 
transgressed at regular intervals by successive governments. These instances 
of contravention of the principle of seniority can be grouped under two 
categories, namely, supersession during Martial Law and autocratic regimes 
and supersession during civilian regimes. It would be evident from this 
discussion that political considerations only became a motivating factor 
 
 84.  NORMAN S. MARSH, INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, THE RULE OF LAW IN 
A FREE SOCIETY: A REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF JURISTS 1, 12 (1959), 
http://icj2.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/1959/01/Rule-of-law-in-a-free-society-
conference-report-1959-eng.pdf. 
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for superseding senior judges of the HCD in elevating judges to the AD 
during the tenure of the second BAL regime (1996–2001) following the 
restoration of parliamentary democracy in Bangladesh in 1991. 
A.  Contravention of the Principle of Seniority in Appointing Judges of 
the AD During Martial Law and Autocratic Regimes 
An attempt will now be made to examine the instances of supersession 
of the senior most judges of the HCD in appointing judges to the AD of 
the Supreme Court during the Martial Law regimes of 1975 and 1982, and 
the autocratic regime of 1990. 
1.  Contravention of the Principle of Seniority in Appointing Judges of 
the Appellate Division by the First Martial Law Regime                             
(August 1975–April 1979) 
Martial law was declared for the first time in the history of Bangladesh 
on August 15, 197585 following the assassination of the President of the 
country, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. President Rahman had initially assumed 
the office of Prime Minister on January 11, 1972, only to use his party’s (BAL) 
transcending majority in the Parliament to get the Constitution (Fourth 
Amendment) Act of 1975 passed on January 25, 1975. This Fourth Amendment, 
inter alia, replaced parliamentary democracy with a presidential form of 
government centering on all-powerful president who had the power to 
declare Bangladesh a one-party state (Bangladesh was in fact declared a 
one-party state on February 25, 1975).86 This declaration came at a time 
when the country had already been in a state of emergency imposed on 
December 28, 1974, by President Mujib.87 Martial law was proclaimed as 
a precautionary measure as emergency powers were not considered enough 
for obviating any public resistance and for meeting any possible threats to 
the newly established regime. 
The convention of the principle of seniority in appointing judges to the 
Supreme Court was violated for the first time in the history of Bangladesh 
when the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator, Justice Sayem, 
elevated Justice Debesh Chandra Bhattachari to the AD superseding the 
 
 85.  Proclamation of Martial Law, Aug. 20, 1975, second preambular para. (Bangl.). 
 86.  CONST. amend. IV, act II, §§ 4, 12, 15, 16, 19, 23 (1975) (Bangl.) (amended 2011). 
 87.  Proclamation of Emergency, GAZZETTE OF BANGLADESH EXTRAORDINARY, No. 
3 (50)/74-CD (CS) (Dec. 28, 1974) (Bangl.). 
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senior-most judge of the HCD, Justice Ruhul Islam.88 Although the first 
martial law regime set in motion the disturbing practice of superseding 
senior-most judges of the HCD in appointing judges of the AD, no political 
or other motivation was apparent behind this lone instance of supersession 
during the life of this regime. 
Bangladesh returned to civilian rule on April 6, 1979, at the initiative 
of President Ziaur Rahman, who was the founder of the BNP. During the 
rule of the BNP from April 6, 1979 to March 23, 1982, there were no 
violations of the principle of seniority in appointing judges of the AD. 
2.  Violation of the Principle of Seniority in Elevating Judges to the 
Appellate Division by the Second Martial Law Regime                               
(March 24, 1982–November 1986) 
Bangladesh’s return to civilian rule was short-lived. President Zia was 
assassinated on May 30, 1981 by a handful of members of the armed forces89 
and Zia’s successor, Justice Abdus Sattar, who had won in a landslide the 
Presidential ballot on November 27, 1981, was eased out of power merely 
four months and four days after his election on March 24, 1982, in a 
bloodless coup.90 This time, the armed forces were under the leadership 
of the Chief of Army Staff, Lt. General H.M. Ershad, who placed the entire 
country under martial law and suspended the operation of the Constitution.91 
This declaration of martial law belied the assertion of Prime Minister Shah 
Azizur Rahman made in the Parliament on March 2, 1982, merely 20 days 
before the proclamation of martial law, that there was no possibility of 
imposing martial law in Bangladesh as “democracy has found firm roots 
in the soil of Bangladesh.”92 
After the declaration of martial law, the convention of seniority in 
appointing judges to the AD from the judges of the HCD was violated on 
two occasions, in April 1982 and December 1985. On April 21, 1982, Ershad, 
as the Chief Martial Law Administrator, promoted Justice A.T.M Masud 
 
 88.  List of Superseded Judges, THE DAINIK SANGBAD, Jan. 14, 2001, 1 (Bangl.) 
(Information collected from the official records of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh). 
 89.  Assassination of President Zia, ASIAN RECORDER, Vol. XXVII, July 2–8, 1981, 16099 
(Bangl.). 
 90.  M. EHTESHAMUL BARI, SUSPENSION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND THE 
UNRESTRAINED EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF PREVENTIVE DETENTION DURING THE SUCCESSIVE 
PROCLAMATIONS OF EMERGENCY IN BANGLADESH: A LEGAL STUDY 291 (2015) [hereinafter 
BARI, SUSPENSION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS]. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  K. K. Thomas, President’s Address to Parliament: Martial Law Ruled Out, 27 
ASIAN RECORDER 16519 (1982). 
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to the AD, bypassing his senior colleague, Justice Mohsin Ali.93 On December 
26, 1985, as the President of Bangladesh, H. M. Ershad elevated Justice 
M.H. Rahman and Justice A.T.M Afzal to the AD superseding three senior 
HCD judges—Justices A.R.M Amirul Islam Chowdhury, Md. Habibur 
Rahman (CSP) and Abdul Matin Khan Chowdhry.94 Similar to the first 
martial law regime, no extraneous considerations could be found for violations 
of the principle of seniority by the second martial law regime. 
3.  Breach of the Principle of Seniority in Appointing Judges of the 
Appellate Division by the Civilian Regime of H.M. Ershad                         
(1986–1990) 
More than four years after the declaration of martial law, Ershad, who 
was nominated by his newly established party (Jatiya Party), sought to 
become a civilian President by contesting and subsequently winning a 
controversial Presidential election on October 15, 1986.95 Three years later in 
1989, Ershad breached the convention of following seniority in appointing 
Justice Mustafa Kamal, a HCD Judge, as the judge of the AD ignoring his 
two senior fellow colleagues—Justice A.R.M. Amirul Islam Chowdhury 
and Justice Sultan Hossain Khan.96 
B.  Breach of the Violation of the Principle of Seniority Following the 
Return to Parliamentary Democracy in Bangladesh 
After more than eight years of iron-fist rule, Ershad was forced out of 
office on December 6, 1990, after people from all walks of life, including 
doctors, lawyers, university teachers, journalists, government officials and 
workers and employees, brought the country to a standstill demanding his 
resignation.97 Following Ershad’s resignation, Chief Justice Shahabuddin 
 
 93.  Hussain Muhammed Ershad, INTERNATIONAL ECOLOGICAL SAFETY COLLABORATIVE 
ORGANIZATION, http://www.iesco-iesco.org/content/en-US/p2068_k913.aspx (last visited 
Nov. 2, 2016); Justice Masud passes away, THE DAILY STAR (Mar. 8, 2015 1:25 AM), 
http://www.thedailystar.net/justice-masud-passes-away-573. 
 94.  Justice Habibur Rahman’s first death anniv. tomorrow, THE DAILY OBSERVER (Jan. 
10, 2015 12:00 AM),  http://www.observerbd.com/2015/01/10/65593.php. 
 95. BARI, SUSPENSION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, supra note 90, at 291–92 (The 
Presidential election of 1986 was boycotted by the BNP and BAL. Furthermore, only ten to 
thirty percent of the electorate turned out to vote). 
 96.  Thomas, President’s Address to Parliament, supra note 92. 
 97.  Bangladesh: President Ershad Resigns, 37(2) ASIAN RECORDER, Jan. 7–13, 1991, 
at 21519. 
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Ahmed was sworn in as the Acting President and his interim government 
was given responsibility of holding a free and fair general election,98 which 
was held on February 27, 1991.99 The BNP formed a government after 
masterminding a simple majority in the Parliament with the support of the 
principal Islamic party of the country, Jamaat-e-Islami.100 Within six months 
of forming a government, the BNP introduced the Constitution (Twelfth 
Amendment) Act of 1991, which was passed by the Parliament unanimously 
on August 6, 1991.101 This Act, among other things, reintroduced 
Parliamentary democracy in Bangladesh, i.e., the “executive power of the 
Republic” was vested in the Prime Minister,102 while the President became 
the ceremonial head of the state.103 
The following is a discussion of the instances of contravention of the 
principle of seniority in appointing the judges of the AD following the 
restoration of parliamentary democracy in Bangladesh during the successive 
regimes of the BNP and BAL. 
1.  Violation of the Principle of Seniority in Elevating Judges to the 
Appellate Division During the Civilian Regime of the                                    
BNP (1991–1996) 
During the regime of BNP, President Abdur Rahman Biswas elevated 
Justices Abdur Rouf and Ismail Uddin Sarkar to the AD on June 8, 1995, 
bypassing their senior colleague, Justice ARM Amirul Islam Chowdhury, 
in the HCD.104 Thus, Justice A.R.M Amirul Islam Chowdhury was ignored 
on four occasions in elevating various junior judges to the AD:  twice by 
President H.M. Ershad and twice by President Abdur Rahman Biswas. 
2.  Violation of the Convention of Seniority in Appointing Appellate 
Division Judges During the Regime of the BAL (1996–2001) 
During the second regime of the BAL, President Justice Shahabuddin 
Ahmed superseded two senior judges of the HCD—the most-senior Justice 
Md. Mozammel Haque and the second most-senior Justice Kazi Shafiuddin. 
President Ahmed, on three occasions, superseded senior judges of the HCD 
when he elevated Justice Mahmudul Amin Chowdhury on June 28, 1999; 
 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Ali Riaz, Bangladesh, in AN INTRODUCTION TO SOUTH ASIAN POL. 58, 79 (Neil 
DeVotta ed., Routledge 2016). 
 100.  ROUNAQ JAHAN, POL. PARTIES IN BANGL., CPD-CMI WORKING PAPER 8, at 7 
(Centre for Policy Dialogue and Chr. Michelsen Institute 2014). 
 101.  THE CONST. OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF BANGL. amend. XII, Act No. 28 of 1991. 
 102.  THE CONST. OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF BANGL. 1972, art. 55(2). 
 103.  Id. art. 48. 
 104.  Thomas, President’s Address to Parliament, supra note 92, at 16519. 
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Justice Kazi Ebadul Haque on January 19, 2000; and Justice Mainur Reza 
Chowdhury on November 28, 2000.105 
It seems that both Justice Md. Mozammel Haque and Justice Kazi 
Shafiuddin were victimized for their bold decisions in certain sensitive 
cases. In November 2000, Justice Haque held the preventive detention 
orders of four leaders of the opposition political party, BNP, as illegal and 
ordered the BAL Government to pay BD Taka four lac (four hundred thousand) 
as compensation to them for unnecessarily keeping them in preventive 
custody.106 Justice Haque, in the contempt case of Mainul Hosein v. Sheikh 
Hasina Wazed107 (the Prime Minister of the Country) held that: 
We are disposing of three applications for drawing of proceedings of contempt of 
Court against the Honourable Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina with a note of desire 
that the Honourable Prime Minister shall be more careful and respectful in making 
any statement or comment with regard to the Judiciary or the judges or the courts 
of Bangladesh in future.108 
The other judge, Justice Shafiuddin, had to pay a heavy price for his 1995 
decision in Anwar Hossain Khan v Speaker of Bangladesh Sangsad Bhabon 
and Others109 in which boycotting of eight sessions of the Parliament by 
the opposition members (elected from the BAL) for one hundred and one 
days from February 1994 to July 1995 was challenged during the regime 
of the BNP Government (1991–1996). Justice Shafiuddin gave an order 
directing the abstaining opposition members to attend the Parliament in 
order to perform and discharge their constitutional obligations. He further 
observed: 
We declare that the salary, emoluments, allowances and other benefits so received 
by the respondents are illegal and unauthorised. The aforesaid illegal and unauthorised 
receipts of salaries, emoluments and allowances by the absentee members of the 
Parliament without leave of the Parliament are recoverable by appropriate authority 
upon the processes of law.110 
Although Justice Haque preferred to go quietly on retirement on December 
1, 2000, Justice Shafiuddin, who was supposed to retire on November 1, 
2001, preferred to resign on November 9, 2000, as a mark of protest against 
 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id.; HC declares the detention of four BNP leaders illegal, THE DAINIK SANGRAM 
(DHAKA), Nov. 2, 2000, at 1. 
 107.  53 DLR (2001) 138 (HCD 2000). 
 108.  Id. at 142. 
 109.  47 DLR (1995) 42, 43 (HCD 1994). 
 110.  Id. at 53. 
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his supersession on three occasions. In an interview with one of the national 
dailies, Justice Shafiuddin claimed that he might have been superseded 
for his above decision given against the BAL in the Anwar Hossain Case 
when he held that their boycotting of the sessions of Parliament was illegal.111 
Notwithstanding the controversies surrounding the political overtones 
in the above instances of elevations, the convention of seniority was violated 
for the fourth time by President Justice Shahbuddin Ahmed on January 10, 
2001. President Ahmed appointed as judges of the AD: a) Justice Golam 
Rabbani in preference to his senior colleague in the HCD, Justice K.M. 
Hasan, and, b) Justice Ruhul Amin bypassing his senior colleague, Justice 
J.R. Mudassir Husain. Furthermore, these instances of supersession took 
place in spite of the Chief Justice’s recommendation that all of these four 
senior judges should be elevated to the AD and that seniority should be 
respected in elevating them. 
The appointment of these judges, who were ranked second and fourth 
respectively in the list of four senior judges of the HCD who were 
recommended by the Chief Justice,112 disregarded time-honored and established 
practice and led to an unprecedented protest by 13 senior lawyers and other 
lawyers of the Supreme Court mainly belonging to the BNP. A meeting 
between the President of the SCBA, Barrister Mainul Hosein, senior lawyers, 
and former presidents and secretaries of the SCBA was held at the SCBA 
office on January 10, 2001.113 In the meeting, a decision was taken to form 
a new forum, the Supreme Council of Lawyers, with Barrister Ishtiaque 
Ahmed, a very distinguished and reputed lawyer, as its Convener.114 This 
new forum would also include other senior lawyers, namely, Dr. Kamal 
Hossain, Barrister Mainul Hosein, Abdul Malek, and Dr. M. Zahir, as its 
members to “unite all lawyers to protect the judiciary from interference 
and keep its independence.”115 It was further agreed that the two superseded 
judges, Justices Hasan and Husain, who were in the “list of senior judges” 
submitted by the Chief Justice, should be appointed to the AD. The five-
member Committee was given the task of pursuing the matter with the relevant 
authorities. Accordingly, the Committee met President Ahmed on January 
13, 2001, and requested that he take the necessary measures for elevating 
 
 111.  An interview with Justice Kazi Shafiuddin, THE DAINIK MANAB ZAMIN, Nov. 
11, 2000, at 1. 
 112.  The list of recommended four judges as sent to the President in order of seniority 
was as follows: 1) Justice K.M. Hasan, 2) Justice Golam Rabbani, 3) Justice JR Mudassir 
Husain and 4) Justice Ruhul Amin.  The Government is against the proposal to appoint 
two more Judges to the Appellate Division, THE DAINIK SAMBAD, supra note 106. 
 113.  Promotion of two HC judges takes lawyers by surprise, THE DAILY STAR, Jan. 
11, 2001, at 1. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
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the two superseded HCD Judges to the AD. The President told the Committee 
that “the proposal should have been given due consideration but he has 
constitutional limitations as he acts on the recommendation of the Prime 
Minister.”116 
Realizing that they were knocking on the wrong door, the members of 
the Committee sought an appointment to meet with Prime Minister Sheikh 
Hasina. But the Prime Minister refused to meet the members of the Committee, 
which showed how committed she was to her position. Subsequently, on 
January 15, 2001, the Minister of Law, Justice, and Parliamentary Affairs 
made a statement before the parliament stating that the appointment of 
judges to the AD was not a matter of promotion and, as such, seniority 
was not the only criterion for making the appointment.117 Rather, in appointing 
judges to the AD, competence, knowledge of law, and commitment to the 
rule of law were also to be taken into account.118 
Notwithstanding the explanation put forward by the Law Minister, a 
group of lawyers of the Supreme Court (considered “pro-opposition” lawyers) 
urged the Chief Justice not to administer the oath to the elevated Justices 
Rabbani and Amin.119 But Chief Justice Rahman proceeded with the scheduled 
oath taking ceremony, which was attended by all the judges of the Supreme 
Court.120 The ceremony took place on January 10, 2001, at his Chamber 
instead of the Judges’ Lounge due to a demonstration organized by the 
lawyers intended to voice their displeasure.121 The judges were confined 
there for more than two hours by the agitating lawyers.122 The lawyers forced 
suspension of the Supreme Court’s functioning on January 11, 2001. 
Consequently, a case was filed against 16 “Pro-Opposition” Lawyers, including 
BNP law-makers Barrister Nazmul Huda and Khandaker Mahbub Uddin 
Ahmed, under the Public Safety Act of 2000123 for their involvement in 
the demonstration at the Supreme Court.124 
 
 116.  Agitating lawyers decide to suspend action, THE DAILY STAR, Jan. 14, 2001, at 1. 
 117.  Bari, The Substantive Independence of the Superior Judiciary, supra note 29, at 150. 
 118.  Id. at 150. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  THE DAILY STAR, supra note 113. 
 123.  SALAHUDDIN AHMED, BANGLADESH: PAST AND PRESENT 247 (2004.) The Public 
Safety Act 2000 was repealed by the Parliament during the regime of the BNP-Jamaat 
Alliance on April 2, 2002. 
 124.  Demonstration at Supreme Court: PSA case against Nazmul Huda, Kh Mahbub, 
14 other lawyers and Morshed Khan,  THE DAILY STAR, Jan. 17, 2001, at 1. 
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Furthermore, it seems that Justice Ruhul Amin was not elevated to the 
AD solely based on the criteria, as had been proffered by the Law Minister 
in the Parliament, but rather as a reward for his verdict (although a split 
one) upholding of the death penalties of 10 of the 15 accused in the 
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Father of the Prime Minister) 
Murder Case as a member of the Death-Reference Bench of the HCD.125 
Conversely, Justice K.M. Hasan, the senior most judge of the HCD, was 
victimized for feeling embarrassed to act as a member of the Death-
Reference Bench.126 A further motive in not elevating Justice Hasan to the 
AD was his previous connection with the BNP as had been divulged by 
the Prime Minister herself in a public address given in Sitakunda on January 
17, 2001, when she said that the BNP wanted their former party leader, 
International Affairs Secretary, and ex-Ambassador, elevated to the AD 
for politicizing the court, which had duly been frustrated.127 
Within a few months, the elevations of Justices Rabbani and Amin as 
judges of the AD in supersession of two of their senior colleagues in the 
HCD were challenged by a junior advocate of the Supreme Court and the 
Secretary General of an NGO, the Bangladesh Human Rights Commission, 
before the HCD in the case of SN Goswami, Advocate v Bangladesh.128 
This was the first time in the history of Bangladesh that an instance of 
supersession of senior judges in the appointment of judges to the AD was 
challenged before a court of law. Justice Syed Amirul Islam, who delivered 
the judgment on June 3, 2001, upheld the legality of the said appointments. 
As he observed: 
Question of supersession can only arise in a case of promotion to a higher post. 
In the present case we are not concerned with the promotion of the judges of the 
High Court Division, to the Appellate Division. It is rather the appointment of 
two new judges in the Appellate Division which is in dispute. An appointment of 
a judge to the Appellate Division from amongst the judges of the High Court 
Division is not a promotion, it is a fresh appointment made by the President under 
Article 95(1) of the Constitution from amongst the qualified persons as contained 
in Sub Article (2) of Article 95 of the Constitution . . . The actions of the President 
in the matter of appointment of judges of either Division of this Court are not 
unfettered in that in appointing a person in the judgeship of either Division the 
precedent condition as laid down in Article 95(2) has to be complied with. Once 
the requirements as laid down in Article 95(2) are fulfilled and the President acts 
 
 125.  Mujib’s Killers Case: A Chronology of Events, THE HINDU (Nov. 19, 2009), 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/mujibs-killers-casea-chronology-ofevents/ 
article51163.ece [hereinafter Mujib’s Killers Case Article]. 
 126.  Justice Hasan felt embarrassed as one of the accused in the case was his relative. 
 127.  BNP appointed an individual who had kicked on the door of the Chief Justice 
as a Judge: Prime Minister in a Public Rally in Sitakunda, THE ITTEFAQ, Jan. 18, 2001, 
at 1. 
 128.  55 DLR (2003) 332, 333 (HCD, 2001). 
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on the advice of the Prime Minister, this Court cannot cause an inquiry as to the 
reason of appointing that person as a Judge.129 
It is noticeable that the learned Justice himself held that the qualification 
requirements, as laid down in Article 95 of the Constitution, are equally 
applicable to the appointment of judges of both the divisions of the Supreme 
Court. Thus the Constitution itself has not provided for any specific criteria, 
such as: a) number of cases disposed of as a HCD judge, thereby demonstrating 
merit and quality; b) handling of complex cases particularly involving 
constitutional issues; and c) analytical ability and professional standard which 
are in higher demand for an AD judge than a HCD judge. Furthermore, 
there is no provision for the advertisement of vacant posts in the AD and 
selection of candidates by a judicial committee consisting of majority 
members from the apex court of the land. Therefore, contrary to the learned 
judge’s claim, the appointment of judges to the AD from amongst the 
HCD Judges appears to be in essence promotion rather than appointment.130 
With regard to the recommendation of the Chief Justice that all the 
relevant four judges of the HCD were equally competent and that seniority 
should be respected, the learned Justice held: 
Be that as it may, if all the judges were equally competent, the Executive did not 
commit any illegality in choosing any two from the equal four inasmuch as there 
is no law or constitutional provision or convention, requiring the seniors to be 
appointed.131 
Thus it is evident that the convention, as pointed out above in section 
IV, of respecting seniority in elevating judges of the AD from amongst 
the judges of the HCD was unknown to the learned Justice Syed Amirul 
Islam. However, he expressed his opinion by way of guidance as to the 
matters to be taken into consideration in elevating a judge of the HCD to 
the AD. As he observed: 
We are aware of the opinion that if a judge of this Division is elevated to the 
Appellate Division it should not be on the basis of seniority alone, rather it should 
be on the basis of seniority-cum-merit. The hard reality is that the quality of the 
judges of this Division, though are of a satisfactory level, all are not equal. Some 
are more brilliant than others. Thus, if seniority be the sole criterion for elevation 
then the most brilliant may be left behind and the less competent may be elevated 
to the Appellate Division simply because he was appointed a judge of this Division at 
an earlier point of time than the others. This will have the following effect on the 
 
 129.  SN Goswami, 55 DLR at 342. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. at 343–44. 
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highest judiciary; firstly, the most brilliant judges may be left behind though they 
could make better contribution to the judiciary. Secondly, if seniority-cum-merit 
becomes the criterion then right after the appointment of a judge in this Division 
he will do his best to improve the quality of his judgment and his overall performance 
as a judge and there will be a sense of competitiveness among the judges in 
performing their judicial duties. This will immensely benefit the nation as a whole 
and the judiciary in particular and the most meritorious will move ahead the less 
meritorious. The judges of this Division will then leave no stone unturned to devote 
themselves whole-heartedly to the job–day in and day out during the tenure of their 
office.132 
It is very difficult to agree with the above observations, for manifestation 
of merit and its objective assessment are very difficult to ascertain. If the 
President is to decide these, then it can be said in the words of same judge 
who in State v Chief Editor, Manabjamin133 observed that: 
[C]an the Government, namely, the major litigant, be justified in enjoying absolute 
authority in nominating and appointing its arbitrators? The answer would be in 
the negative. The executive cannot be allowed to enjoy the absolute primacy in 
the matter of appointment of judges as its “royal privilege”. If such a process is 
allowed to continue, the independence of judiciary will never be attained.134 
In the same vein, if the Chief Justice alone is given the task of evaluating 
the merits of the judges of the HCD, there is again the possibility of the 
following apprehension, which was articulated by the same judge in the 
previous case: 
[A]fter all the Chief Justice is a man with all the failings, all the sentiments and 
all the prejudices which we as common people have and therefore we think that 
the matter should not be left in the hands of the learned Chief Justice alone and a 
better result would be derived if the opinion is formed in the matter of 
appointment of judges in the Full Court Meeting of the Supreme Court.135 
However, during the pendency of the SN Goswami Case, and 17 days 
before the pronouncement of the judgment, President Ahmed once again 
contravened the principle of seniority in appointing a judge of the AD.136 
On May 15, 2001, President Ahmed elevated Justice Md. Fazlul Karim, 
who due to a split decision of the two-member Death Reference Bench of 
the HCD in the Bangabandhu Murder Case, had delivered the final judgment 
as the third judge in a second bench confirming death sentences of 12 of 
the accused, to the AD in supersession of three senior judges of the HCD, 
 
 132.  Id. at 349. 
 133.  31 CLC 3805 (HCD, 2002) (Bangl.); 31 CLC 3806 (HCD, 2002) (Bangl.). 
 134.  Id. para. 253. 
 135.  Id. para. 248. 
 136.  Adib Shamsuddin & Sheikh Amena Jahan, A Long Way Gone, THE DAILY STAR 
(June 28, 2016, 12:00 AM), http://www.thedailystar.net/law-our-rights/long-way-gone-
1246612. 
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namely, Justices K.M. Hasan, Syed JR Mudassir Husain and Abu Sayeed 
Ahmed.137 
Thus, the convention of seniority in appointing judges of the AD from 
amongst the HCD judges was violated on five occasions during the Government 
of the BAL, and Justices Hasan and Husain became the victim of supersession 
on two occasions. 
3.  Contravention of the Convention of Seniority in Appointing             
Judges of the AD During the BNP Regime (2001–2006) 
The BNP Government, which came into power in October 2001 and 
remained in power until October 2006, adhered to the convention of 
following seniority in elevating judges to the AD from amongst the HCD 
judges for about two years. Justice K.M. Hasan, who had been superseded 
twice, was elevated to the AD on January 20, 2002.138 About two months 
later, on March 5, 2002, Justice Syed JR Mudassir Husain, who had also 
been superseded twice, and Justice Abu Syed Ahmed, who had been bypassed 
once, were appointed to the AD. Justices Kazi A.T.M Monowaruddin, 
Fazlul Hoque and Md. Hamidul Hoque were also appointed to the AD on 
June 25, 2002, July 17, 2002 and June 29, 2003, respectively, without any 
deviation from the principle of seniority.139 
But the BNP regime departed from the convention of following seniority 
for the first time on July 13, 2003, when Justice MM Ruhul Amin was 
appointed to the AD in supersession of Justice Syed Amirul Islam, who 
had given the judgment in the SN Goswami’s Case, opposing the seniority 
rule in elevating judges to the AD.140 Justice Islam was superseded for the 
second time the very next month, on August 27, 2003, when Justice Md. 
Tofazzal Islam was appointed as a judge of the AD.141 He was superseded 
for the third and fourth times while appointing Justices M.A. Aziz and 
Amirul Kabir Chowdhury to the AD on January 7, 2004, and February 26, 
2004, respectively.142 When Justice Aziz received appointment as the Chief 
 
 137.  See Mujib’s Killers Case Article, supra note 125. 
 138.  KM Hasan New CJ, THE DAILY STAR (June 23, 2003), http:// archive.thedailystar.net/ 
2003/06/ 23/d3062301033.htm. 
 139.  Bari, The Substantive Independence of the Superior Judiciary, supra note 29, at 155. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. at 155–56. 
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Election Commissioner on May 23, 2005,143 Justice Md. Joynul Abedin 
succeeded him to the AD in supersession of three senior judges of the 
HCD Justices Syed Amirul Islam, Md. Hassan Ameen, and A.K. Badrul 
Hoque.144 
Thus, it appears that Justice Syed Amirul Islam, who in SN Goswami’s 
case had upheld the instance of supersession in appointing judges to the 
AD supposedly due to the absence of any “constitutional provision or 
convention” to that effect and had maintained that appointment should be 
made on the basis of “seniority-cum-merit” for instilling a sense of  
competitiveness among the judges, failed to make an impression on his 
appointing authority during the BNP regime on five occasions, to use his 
own words, as ‘the most meritorious’ judge for moving “ahead the less 
meritorious.”145 However, it can be argued that his repeated supersessions 
might have finally made him realize that in most cases of supersession, 
political considerations or affiliations instead of merits have been the dominant 
factors.146 
4.  Contravention of the Convention of Seniority in Appointing Judges of 
the AD During the Present BAL Regime (January 2009-to-date) 
The Supreme Judicial Commission, which was established on March 
16, 2008, through a Presidential Ordinance during the regime of the Care-
taker Government for selecting and recommending “competent persons 
for appointment as judges of the Supreme Court,” in its first meeting held 
on October 17, 2008, recommended four senior-most judges of the HCD, 
namely, Justices Shah Abu Nayeem Mominur Rahman, Md. Abdul Quddus, 
Md. Abdul Aziz and Bijan Kumar Das, for filling two vacant posts in the 
AD.147 Although the life of the Supreme Judicial Commission came to an 
abrupt end in February 2009 as the newly elected regime of the BAL did 
not place the ordinance concerning its formation for approval before the 
Parliament,148 the President on March 4, 2009, appointed Justices Shah 
Abu Nayeem Mominur Rahman and Md. Abdul Aziz, both recommended 
 
 143.  Shakhawat Liton, Justice Aziz Becomes CEC, THE DAILY STAR (May 24, 2005), 
http://archive.thedailystar.net/2005/05/24/d5052401011.htm. 
 144.  Bari, The Substantive Independence of the Superior Judiciary, supra note 29, at 156. 
 145.  Id.; SN Goswami v. Bangladesh, 55 DLR (HCD) 332, 343–49 (2003). 
 146.  Bari, The Substantive Independence of the Superior Judiciary, supra note 29, at 156. 
 147.  Bari, The Natural Death, supra note 2, at 9, 13; 10 New HC Judges to be Appointed, 
THE DAILY STAR (Oct. 31, 2008), http://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-61184. 
 148.  The life of an ordinance is always contingent on it receiving approval of the 
parliament. Although the BAL regime had placed 54 Ordinances promulgated by the President 
during the regime of the “Care-taker” Government before the Parliament in February 2009, 
the Supreme Judicial Commission Ordinance was one of the 68 ordinances which were 
dropped by the regime. See Bari, The Natural Death, supra note 2, at 14. 
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by the Commission, as judges of the AD.149 After increasing the number 
of posts of judges in the AD of Supreme Court from seven to 11 on July 9, 
2009, President Rahman on July 14, 2009, appointed four senior-most judges 
of the HCD, Justices Bijan Kumar Das, ABM Khairul Haque, Md Muzzammel 
Hossain and Surendra Kumar Sinha, as judges of the AD.150 The principle 
of seniority was also observed in the elevation of Justices MA Wahab Miah, 
Nazmun Ara Sultana, Syed Mahmud Hossain and M Imman Ali to the AD 
on February 23, 2011.151 
Thus, it seems that the present regime of the BAL, which has the previous 
track record of violating the convention of seniority in appointing the 
Chief Justice of Bangladesh and judges of the AD on numerous occasions,152 
had initially complied with the convention of seniority in appointing judges 
from the HCD to the AD,153 perhaps keeping in mind the SCBA’s persistent 
and assiduous demand for conforming to the principle of seniority in the 
“promotion process.”154 However, the regime returned to its previous tradition 
of overlooking senior judges of the HCD in making appointments to the AD 
approximately eight months prior to the completion of its tenure in office.155 
On March 28, 2013, the President elevated four judges, Justices Mohammad 
Anwarul Haque, Siddiqur Rahman Miah, Hasan Foez Siddique and AHM 
Shamsuddin Chowdhury Manik, of the HCD to the AD.156 Of these four, 
the principle of seniority was followed only in respect of the appointment 
of Justice Haque. Justice Miah was promoted in supersession of three of 
his colleagues in the HCD while Justices Siddique and Manik were elevated 
 
 149.  SC Appellate Division gets 2 New Judges, THE DAILY STAR (Mar. 5, 2009, 12:00 
AM), http://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-78543. 
 150.  SC Appellate Division gets 4 More Judges, THE DAILY STAR (July 15, 2009), 
http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/print_news.php?nid=96998. 
 151.  SC gets 1st Woman Judge, THE DAILY STAR (Feb. 23, 2011, 12:00 AM), http:// 
www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-175201. 
 152.  Aminul Hoque & Kawser Ahmed, Rekindling an Old Debate: How Effective a 
Caretaker Government can Be?, THE DAILY STAR (Dec. 5, 2004), http://archive.thedailystar. 
net/law/2004/12/01/opinion.htm. 
 153.  SC Appellate Division gets 2 New Judges, supra note 149; SC Appellate Division 
gets 4 More Judges, supra note 150. 
 154.  Ashutosh Sarkar, SC May get New Judges Next Month, THE DAILY STAR (Dec. 
23, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-167079. 
 155.  See SC Gets 4 more Judges, THE DAILY STAR (Mar. 29, 2013, 12:00 AM), http:// 
www.thedailystar.net/news/sc-gets-4-more-judges. 
 156. SC Gets 4 More Judges, THE DAILY STAR (Mar. 28, 2013, 10:58 PM), http://www. 
thedailystar.net/news/sc-gets-4-more-judges. 
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in supersession of an astounding 38 senior judges.157 Both Justices Siddique 
and Manik had received their initial appointments as Additional Judges of 
the HCD in 2001 when the BAL was in power. The SCBA maintained its 
tradition of protesting the supersession of senior judges of the HCD in 
appointing the judges of the AD.158 It arranged for demonstration on the 
walkway of the first floor of the Supreme Court Building where the said 
judges were administered oath on March 31, 2013.159 
It should be stressed here that among the above four appointees, the 
appointment of Justice Manik was the most controversial. First, Justice 
Manik, during his tenure as a judge of the HCD, made public political 
statements and also sided with the ruling party during a TV talk show in 
April 2010, in contravention of the Code of Conduct for Judges of the 
Supreme Court of 2000,160 which was in force at the time prohibiting judges 
from expressing their views in public on political matters.161 Second, he 
used his bench, which also included a junior judge, as an avenue for persecuting 
academicians, civil society members, journalists, and lawyers on account 
of their political opinions which went against the party in power. For instance, 
Justice Manik ordered the arrest of MU Ahmed, a Pro-BNP Lawyer and 
a former Assistant Attorney General, for allegedly obstructing the law 
enforcement agencies from performing their duties during a scuffle that 
 
 157.  Skip Oath to 4 New SC Judges: Outgoing Bar President Urges CJ, THE DAILY 
STAR, Mar. 31, 2013, last page; Controversial Appointment of Judges in the Appellate Division 
of the Supreme Court: Bad Precedent has been Created, NEWS FROM BANGLADESH.NET 
(Apr. 1, 2013, 02:10pm), http://newsfrombangladesh.net/new/readers-opinion/11293-
controversial-appointment-of-judges-in-the-appalate-division-of-the-supreme-court-bad-
precedent-has-been-created. 
 158.  See 4 SC Judges Take Oath, THE DAILY STAR (Apr. 1, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www. 
thedailystar.net/news/4-sc-judges-take-oath. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  The former clauses (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) of Article 96 of the Constitution of 
Bangladesh 1972 read together stipulated that a judge of the Supreme Court could only be 
removed from office by the President upon recommendation by the Supreme Judicial 
Council, which was composed of the Chief Justice and the two next senior judges of the 
AD, to that effect after a formal inquiry. 
The Constitution in Article 96(4)(a) also empowered the Council to “prescribe a Code 
of Conduct to be observed by the Judges”. Accordingly, on May 7, 2000, the Council headed 
by then Chief Justice Latifur Rahman formulated a Code of Conduct for the Judges of the 
Supreme Court. However, the BAL after returning to power through the controversial 
election of 2014 used its overwhelming majority in the Parliament to get the Constitution 
(Sixteenth Amendment) Act 2014 passed, which replaced the provisions concerning the 
Supreme Judicial Council in Article 96 of the Constitution with provisions which gave the 
Parliament the carte blanche power to recommend the removal of judge of the Supreme 
Court from office. BANGL. CONST. art. 96 (amended 2014). 
 161. Judge A.F.M. Abdur Rahman, Code of Conduct for the Judges, BANGL. L. HOUSE, 
r.6 [no longer in force] (Oct. 1, 2011), http://bdlawhouse.blogspot.com/2011/10/code-of-
conduct-for-judges.html. 
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broke out between the Pro-BNP and Pro-BAL Lawyers before his bench 
after he had remarked that the BNP Chairperson and former Prime Minister 
Begum Khaleda Zia’s statement about the adverse impact of the Fifteenth 
Amendment Act of 2011 on the Constitution was “tantamount to sedition” 
during a hearing on August 2, 2011.162 
In pursuance of the order, Ahmed was arrested in the early hours of August 
11, 2011. He was allegedly tortured in police custody to the extent that 
within 5 hours of his arrest he suffered a massive heart attack. Although 
he was admitted to a local hospital for medical treatment, he passed away 
on August 26, 2011, 15 days after his arrest.163 The arrest and subsequent 
death of Ahmed outraged the legal fraternity. The SCBA passed a resolution 
blaming Justice Manik for his death.164 However, Justice Manik’s response 
to this was not befitting the high office he was holding at the time. For he 
once again, in contravention of the Code of Conduct of 2000, which not 
only required judges to maintain a degree of aloofness consistent with the 
dignity of their office but also prohibited them from making their views 
public on matters “that are pending or are likely to arise for judicial 
determination,”165 participated in a TV talk-show and claimed that Ahmed 
died of his pre-existing physical condition and not due to police persecution.166 
Seven months later, on March 5, 2012, Justice Manik’s bench issued an 
order directing the authorities of the Bangladesh Open University to file a 
criminal complaint against a number of academics for allegedly distorting 
the history of the Liberation War in two of the University’s textbooks on 
 
 162.  Supreme Court Lawyer Died in Police Custody: Severe Torture Alleged, Judicial 
Probe Demanded, BANGL. L. HOUSE (Aug. 26, 2011), http://bdlawhouse.blog spot.com.au/2011/ 
08/supreme-court-lawyer-died-in-police.html; Ashutosh Sarkar, “Constitutional Hurl” Threat, 
Object Thrown at HC Judges, The DAILY STAR (Aug. 11, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www. 
thedailystar.net /news-detail-197020. 
 163.  Supreme Court Lawyer Died in Police Custody: Severe Torture Alleged, Judicial 
Probe Demanded, BANGL. L. HOUSE (Aug. 26, 2011), http://bdlawhouse.blogspot.com.au/ 
2011/08/supreme-court-lawyer-died-in-police.html. 
 164.  Ehsanul Haque Jasim, Unprecedented Departure of Justice Shamsuddin: No 
Farewell by AG Office SCBA, NEW NATION (Sept. 19, 2015), http://thedailynewnation.com/news/ 
67594/unprecedented-departure-of-justice-shamsuddin.html. 
 165.  Judge A.F.M. Abdur Rahman, Code of Conduct for the Judges, BANGL. L. 
HOUSE, r.5, 6 (Oct. 1, 2011), http://bdlawhouse.blogspot.com/2011/10/code-of-conduct-
for-judges.html. 
 166.  Editor Mahmudur Seeks Removal of Justice Shamsuddin, NEW AGE, Sept. 26, 
2012, at 1; No greetings for SC judges: Bar leaders protest death of pro-BNP leaders, THE 
DAILY STAR (Oct. 10, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-205906. 
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Civics and Sociology respectively.167 These academics included the former 
Vice-Chancellor of the University, M. Ershadul Bari, who was a Professor 
of Law and was not involved in the writing of either of the said books.168 
It seems that he was sought to be implicated in the complaint solely because 
of his political ideology. In this context, it is noteworthy that mentioning 
Major General Ziaur Rahman, the founder of the BNP, instead of 
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as the proclaimer of independence 
of Bangladesh from then West Pakistan in the said textbooks, inter alia, 
was construed as constituting distortion of history. To this end, these 
books relied on the two declarations made by General Zia which were 
broadcast on Biplobi Betar Kendra [Revolutionary Radio Station], Chittagong 
on March 27 and 28, 1971, respectively. First, declaring the independence 
of Bangladesh from Pakistan in his capacity as the provisional “President 
and Commander-in-Chief of the Bangladesh liberation army” and subsequently 
making the same declaration the very next day but this time on behalf of 
Mujib.169 However, in June 2009, a bench of the HCD comprised of Justices 
Haque and Ahmed, relying on the Proclamation of Independence, which 
was issued by the Provisional Government of Bangladesh170 on April 10, 1971, 
and which stated that Mujib had made “a declaration of independence” on 
March 26, 1971,171 declared that it is Mujib who had proclaimed the 
independence of Bangladesh.172 It seems that Justice Manik had relied on 
this decision for issuing the above order against the academics. But in 
doing so he overlooked the facts that the said textbooks were initially 
published in 2002 and later reprinted in the years 2005 and 2009, and Article 
 
 167.  U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, 
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2012: BANGLADESH 13 (2012), 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2012humanrightsreport/index.htm?dlid=204395&yea
r=2012#wrapper; DU, BOU Teachers to Face Criminal Charge, The DAILY STAR, (Mar. 
7, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-225298. 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Bangladesh Reports Death of President Ziaur Rahman, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 
1981), http://www.nytimes.com/1981/05/30/world/bangladesh-reports-death-of-president- 
ziaur-rahman.html; Julfikar Ali Manik & Ashutosh Sarkar, It’s Bangabandhu, not Zia: HC 
Rules Sheikh Mujib Declared Independence, THE DAILY STAR, (June 21, 2009), http://www. 
thedailystar.net/news-detail-93650. 
 170.  The Provisional Government was formed by the leaders of the BAL on April 
10, 1971 for coordinating Bangladesh’s war of independence. Provisional Government of 
Bangladesh, MUJIBNAGAR PORTAL (last visited Nov. 1, 2016), http://www.mujibnagar.com/ 
mujibnagar-government/provisional-government-of-bangladesh. 
 171.  THE PROCLAMATION OF INDEPENDENCE [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 10, 1971, (Bangl.), 
http://www.docstrangelove.com/uploads/1971/sbbk/documents/Proclamation%201971_
M_Dalil_Vol_03_MMR.pdf. 
 172.  Manik & Sarkar, supra note 169. 
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35(1) of the Constitution of Bangladesh expressly prohibits the retrospective 
use of laws to criminalize conduct.173 
Third, Justice Manik, during his time as a judge of the HCD, did not 
write the judgments of many cases. He also did not deliver judgments in 
a number of cases. These omissions on the part of Justice Manik, which 
were also at odds with the Code of Conduct of 2000,174 significantly 
disadvantaged litigants as they were deprived of the opportunity to institute 
appeal petitions before the AD.175 In light of these, it is evident that Justice 
Manik was elevated to the AD not because of his record as a judge of the 
HCD but rather on political considerations.176 
Following the retirement of Justices Mohammad Anwarul Haque, Siddiqur 
Rahman Miah and Shamsuddin Chowdhury Manik, the President on February 
7, 2016, elevated Justices Mirza Hussain Haider, Md. Nizamul Huq, and 
Mohammad Bazlur Rahman of the HCD to the AD.177 The principle of 
seniority was not adhered to in respect to the appointment of any of these 
judges. Justice Haider was elevated in supersession of the senior-most judge 
of the HCD, Justice Dastagir Hossain, while Justices Huq and Rahman were 
elevated in supersession of 28 senior judges.178 It should be stressed here 
that Justice Huq was previously the Chairman of the International Crimes 
Tribunal, which was established for investigating war crimes committed 
during the War of Independence from Pakistan.179 In December 2012, the 
 
 173.  The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 1972, art 35(1) states:  
No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force 
at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected 
to a penalty greater than, or different from, that which might have been inflicted 
under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. 
BANGL. CONST. art. 35(1). 
 174.  Bangladesh’s Judicial Code of Conduct provided that “[A] judge should dispose 
promptly the business of the court including avoiding inordinate delay in delivering 
judgments/orders.” Judge A.F.M. Abdur Rahman, Code of Conduct for the Judges, BANGL. 
L. HOUSE, r.5 (Oct. 1, 2011), http://bdlawhouse.blogspot.com/2011/10/code-of-conduct-
for-judges.html. 
 175.  No Farewell to Justice Shamsuddin Manik, DAILY OBSERVER (Sept. 18, 2015, 
12:00 AM), http://www.observerbd.com/2015/09/18/111307.php. 
 176.  See id. 
 177.  Chief Justice Swears in Three Judges to the Appellate Division, BDNEWS24.COM 
(Feb. 8, 2016), http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2016/02/08/chief-justice-swears-in-three- 
judges-to-the-appellate-division. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Id.; Trying War Crimes in Bangladesh: The Trial of the Birth of a Nation, ECONOMIST, 
Dec. 15, 2012, http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21568349-week-chairman-bangladeshs- 
international-crimes-tribunal-resigned-we-explain. 
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Economist published the transcript of conversations between Justice Huq 
and a Belgium-based lawyer of Bangladeshi origin through Skype and 
email.180 It revealed that Justice Huq had constant contacts with executive 
branch of the government, which had been unduly pressurizing him to 
deliver guilty verdicts against the leaders of Jamaat-e-Islami, who were 
charged with the commission of war crimes during the Liberation War 
rather hastily.181 It was further revealed that in lieu of these verdicts, he 
was promised a promotion to the AD.182 Few days after the publication of 
this sensitive news, on December 11, 2012, Justice Huq resigned as the 
Chairman of the Tribunal and returned to the HCD.183 It seems that the 
promise made to Justice Huq in 2012 was finally fulfilled by the regime 
through his elevation to the AD.184 
With these appointments, the regime of BAL has so far contravened the 
principle of seniority six times in elevating judges of the HCD to the AD, 
thereby surpassing the previous record of supersession on five occasions, 
which had been jointly held by the previous BNP (2001–2006) and BAL 
(1996–2001) regimes. In doing so, the BAL has been able to pack the higher 
division of the apex court of the nation with judges, who had received 
their initial appointment to the HCD during its tenure in office from 1996 
to 2001. It is also noteworthy that most of these judges are expected to remain 
in office for another five to seven years. For example, Justice Mirza Hussain 
Haider is expected to retire from office on February 28, 2021, Justice Syed 
Mahmud Hossain on December 30, 2022, Justice Mohammad Bazlur Rahman 
on April 11, 2022, Justice Md. Iman Ali on December 31, 2022, and Justice 
Hasan Foez Siddique on September 25, 2023.185 Thus, it is evident that 
the BAL has proceeded in a calculated manner in contravening the principle 
of seniority for composing an AD of its choice, thereby undermining the 
court’s status as an independent and impartial tribunal which is indispensable 
for a society proclaiming the rule of law. 
 
 180.  Trying War Crimes in Bangladesh: The Trial of the Birth of a Nation, supra note 
179. 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  See id. 
 183.  See id. 
 184.  See id. 
 185.  This information has been compiled on the basis of Article 96(1) of the 
Constitution of Bangladesh 1972 and the biographical details of these judges as contained 
in the website of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh. See Constitution of Bangladesh, which 
in Article 96(1) stipulates that the judges of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh are to 
remain in office until they attain the age of 67 years. BANGL. CONST. art. 96(1); Judges’ 
List: Appellate Division, SUP. CT. BANGL. (last visited Nov. 10, 2016), http://www.supreme 
court.gov.bd/nweb/?page=judges.php&menu=11&div_id=1. 
BARI (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2017  2:24 PM 
[VOL. 18:  33, 2016]  Convenient Means to a Politicized Bench 
  SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 
 73 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
First, the foregoing discussion reveals that although Article 95 of the 
Bangladesh Constitution does not provide for the appointment of the senior- 
most judge of the AD of the Supreme Court as the Chief Justice of Bangladesh, 
a convention to this effect had been developed following Bangladesh’s 
independence.186 This convention has been contravened at regular intervals 
since June 2003 on extraneous considerations. 
Although it is quite possible that in a given case the inflexible rule of 
seniority can lower judicial performance as the senior most judge might 
not be the most suitable choice or might not be able to live up to the highest 
standard expected of him, the rule of seniority must be adhered to in 
appointing the Chief Justice for the following reasons: 
a) There is a greater safety in appointing the senior-most judge as the Chief 
Justice, the sentinel qui vive of the independence of the judiciary. Doing so 
would deprive the President from picking and choosing among the judges on 
the basis of extraneous considerations, e.g. political or personal favoritism. 
b) The supersession of the senior-most judge in appointing the Chief Justice of 
Bangladesh will hurt his dignity and self-respect as the cause list is printed 
in accordance with the seniority of the judges and the judges sit in that order. 
He might also feel belittled in the eyes of others as an incompetent and 
inefficient judge. Consequently, he may take retirement or take leave until 
retirement, thereby creating a vacuum of experienced and competent judges 
in the AD. 
c) The appointment of the Chief Justice by seniority will prevent a scramble 
among judges of the Supreme Court for the highest office. This scramble 
would be nothing but a competition to show who has better imbibed the 
gospel of the ruling party so as to capture the eye and ear of the appointing 
authority whenever a vacancy arises. Even the junior-most judge may think 
that by giving a decision in favor of the executive in a case and by cultivating 
good relation with it, he would stand a good chance of becoming the Chief 
Justice of Bangladesh, which in turn has the disturbing impact of ruining the 
highest institution of justice and shattering public confidence in it. 
The Constitution of Bangladesh provides for the appointment of a regular 
Chief Justice and an acting Chief Justice. Article 95 of the Bangladesh 
Constitution stipulates for the regular appointment of the Chief Justice, 
while Article 97 speaks of the appointment of an Acting Chief Justice as 
a stop-gap arrangement for a shorter period.187 Unlike the Constitution of 
 
 186.  BANGL. CONST. art. 95. 
 187.  BANGL. CONST. art. 95, 97. 
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India, which, in Article 126,188 has empowered the President to appoint 
any judge of the Supreme Court irrespective of seniority as acting Chief 
Justice “when the office of the Chief Justice of India is vacant” or when 
the Chief Justice is unable to perform his duties “by reason of absence or 
otherwise,” the Constitution of Bangladesh in Article 97189 unequivocally 
provides for following the mechanical rule of seniority by the President in 
appointing the acting Chief Justice of Bangladesh when a vacancy arises 
in the office or when the Chief Justice is unable to perform his functions 
due to absence, illness or any other cause. It seems that the expression “[i]f 
the office of the Chief Justice becomes vacant” used in Article 97 does 
not refer to the vacancy which occurs on account of the normal retirement 
of the incumbent Chief Justice, rather it refers only to the vacancy caused 
by sudden death, resignation, illness or any other unforeseen reasons.190 
In the case of an unexpected vacancy, the Constitution of Bangladesh provides 
that the President will appointment an Acting Chief Justice solely on the 
basis of seniority, which negatives the possibility of a patronage appointment. 
It can strongly be argued that a similar approach should be adopted for 
appointing the regular Chief Justice of Bangladesh through the introduction 
of an amendment to Article 95 of the Constitution to the effect that the 
President shall appoint only the senior-most judge of the AD of the Supreme 
Court as the Chief Justice of Bangladesh. 
In this context, the recommendation of the Arrears Committee, appointed 
by the Government of India in 1989 to examine large arrears in the High 
Courts and to suggest remedies, made in its Report is noteworthy: “The 
Committee . . . recommends that the second proviso to Article 124(2) be 
deleted and an appropriate proviso be substituted to the effect that the senior 
most Judge of the Supreme Court shall ordinarily be appointed as the Chief 
Justice of India.”191 
Second, the discussion in this Article also reveals that the executive 
branch has been granted the authority by the Constitution to increase the 
number of judges of the AD on its subjective satisfaction, which in turn 
provides it with significant leeway to pack the bench with judges who share 
 
 188.  INDIA CONST. art. 126. 
 189.  The Bangladesh constitution states in article 97 that 
If the office of the Chief Justice becomes vacant, or if the President is satisfied 
that the Chief Justice is, on account of absence, illness, or any other cause, unable to 
perform the functions of his office, those functions shall, until some other person 
has entered upon that office, or until the Chief Justice has resumed his duties, as 
the case may be, be performed by the next most senior judge of the Appellate 
Division. 
BANGL. CONST. art. 97. 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  Arrears Comm. Rep. 1989, ¶ 7.20 (India). 
BARI (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2017  2:24 PM 
[VOL. 18:  33, 2016]  Convenient Means to a Politicized Bench 
  SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 
 75 
its political philosophy. Therefore, in order to prevent the practice of 
packing of the AD with the judges having similar political allegiance and 
ideological outlook after increasing the number of judges in accordance 
with executive’s subjective satisfaction, an amendment should be introduced 
in Article 94(2) of the Constitution of Bangladesh requiring the President 
to exercise his power of increasing the number of judges upon a request of 
the Supreme Court as provided for by the Constitution of the Commonwealth 
of Puerto Rico.192 
Third, it is also evident that since August 13, 1976, the convention of 
appointing the judges of the AD from amongst the judges of the HCD based 
on seniority after consultation with the Chief Justice has been violated 
both by the civilian and martial law regimes on numerous occasions. In 
this context, the example set by Justice Syed Mahboob Morshed, the then 
Chief Justice of the East Pakistan (Dacca) High Court, is noteworthy. 
Justice Morshed in 1967 had recommended Mr. Tayyabuddin Talukder 
for appointment as the judge of the High Court. The Chief Justice of 
Pakistan, Justice A.R. Cornelius, for unknown reasons did not support his 
recommendation and, because of this, the president did not make the 
appointment. In protest of the flouting of his recommendation, Justice 
Morshed resigned from the office of the Chief Justice of the High Court 
of East Pakistan on November 15, 1967,193 thereby setting a shining example 
in the judicial history of former East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) for 
upholding the dignity and authority of the office of the Chief Justice and 
for demonstrating his conviction in effective and meaningful consultation 
with the said office. However, no Chief Justice of Bangladesh has ever 
stepped into the shoes of Justice Morshed in similar circumstances. 
Furthermore, it has not been kept in mind that the violation of the established 
convention of appointing the senior most judge of the HCD as the judge 
of the AD is obviously a breach of his legitimate expectation. The obligation 
of the bar194 in resisting any encroachment of the convention of seniority 
in appointing judges of the AD on political considerations has made them 
controversial, which in turn has had the disastrous impact of lowering public 
 
 192.  Puerto Rico’s constitution at article 5 provides that “[T]he number of Justices 
[of the Supreme Court] may be changed only by law upon request of the Supreme Court.” 
P.R. CONST. art. V, § 3. 
 193.  Quoted in Al-Jehad Tr. v. Pakistan, 1996 PLD (SC) 324, 384. 
 194.  Canons of Professional Conduct and Etiquette of the Bar Council 1969, c. 3, 
art. 7 (Bangl.) (casts an obligation upon the members of the Bar to resist any attempt to 
appoint a person as a judge on political considerations). 
BARI (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2017  2:24 PM 
 
76 
faith, confidence, and trust in the highest seat of justice as the impartial 
adjudicator of disputes. Since the selection of judges is of critical importance 
in ensuring quality justice, keeping the public confidence unshaken in the 
bench, and protecting the Supreme Court from disrepute, the principle of 
appointing the senior-most puisne judge of the HCD to the judgeship of 
the AD as a mandatory provision should also be inserted in Article 95(1) 
of the Constitution by means of an amendment. 
It should also be pointed out here that, unlike the constitutions of some 
of the democratic nations, such as the constitutions of the United States of 
America195 and Australia,196 both of which provide for complex procedures 
to amend the Constitution, the Constitution of Bangladesh provides for a 
relatively simple procedure for amending its provisions.197 Thus, all that 
is required is for the politicians of the country to come to the realization 
“that the interest of the community requires that neither political nor personal 
patronage nor a desire to placate any section of a society, should play any 
part in making judicial appointments.”198 
 
 195.  U.S. CONST. art. V (“The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall 
deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application 
of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing 
Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of 
this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, 
or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification 
may be proposed by the Congress; Provided [that no Amendment which may be made 
prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first 
and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and] that no State, without its 
Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate”). 
 196.  Australian Constitution s. 128 (requires any proposed amendment to be passed: 
a) by an absolute majority of both Houses of the Federal Parliament or by one House twice, 
and, b) at a referendum by a majority of the people as a whole and by a majority of the 
people in a majority of states). 
 197.  BANGL. CONST. art. 142(a)(ii) (any proposed bill for amendment to the Constitution 
can be passed by the votes of “two-thirds of the total number of members of the 
Parliament.”). 
 198.  Harry Gibbs, The Appointment of Judges, 61 AUSTL. L.J. 7, 11 (1987). 
